Disputed liability for electrocution deaths must be determined in civil suits, not writ proceedings.

The petitioner’s husband died by electrocution on 16 February 2026 at the fourth respondent’s farmland.

She sought compensation from the first to third respondents, TANGEDCO officials, by representation dated 11 March 2026; alleging that it remained unconsidered, she filed this writ petition.

TANGEDCO submitted that, under a Division Bench decision, the petitioner should pursue a civil suit against the private party.

The Court dispensed with notice to the fourth respondent.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to a writ directing TANGEDCO to pay compensation for her husband’s electrocution death.

Whether, instead of adjudicating liability in writ proceedings, the petitioner could be permitted to pursue a civil remedy against the private party.

Article 226 of the Constitution provides the basis for the writ jurisdiction invoked.

The Court relied on the Division Bench decision in W.P.(MD) No. 19843 of 2017, dated 10 December 2025, which discussed the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher and strict liability: liability under that rule depends on the dangerous thing having escaped from the defendant’s domain or control.

The Division Bench reasoned that, where a consumer illegally erects an electric fence, responsibility may lie with the person who erected or controlled it rather than TANGEDCO, and that disputed factual questions concerning private-party liability are not suitable for determination in writ proceedings; the affected person may pursue a civil suit.

The Court treated the Division Bench’s reasoning as applicable to the petitioner’s claim.

Because the alleged electrocution occurred on the fourth respondent’s farmland and the relevant liability depended on facts not suited to adjudication in writ proceedings, the Court did not determine who was responsible for the death or direct TANGEDCO to pay compensation.

Instead, it preserved the petitioner’s remedy by permitting her to bring a civil suit.

It permitted the petitioner to institute a suit before the jurisdictional civil court without payment of the requisite court fee, in accordance with law.

The civil court was directed to take the suit on file and number it subject to procedural compliance, and thereafter decide it on the merits as expeditiously as possible, preferably within eight months of numbering.

No costs were awarded.