Disputed title and civil remedies do not warrant quashing where FIR prima facie discloses cognizable offences.

The petitioners, father and son, sought quashing under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution read with Section 482 CrPC of FIR No. 414/2023, Police Station Neb Sarai, registered under Sections 420 and 448 read with Section 34 IPC.

The dispute arose from a proposed ₹9 crore transaction concerning property No. 117-A, Central Avenue, Sainik Farms. The petitioners paid ₹11,000, issued two cheques aggregating ₹25 lakhs, and transferred ₹20 lakhs through RTGS on 20 March 2023; they entered into possession on or about 21 March 2023.

The petitioners alleged that they were induced to part with money without disclosure of defects and disputes concerning title, whereas respondent No. 2 alleged that the petitioners obtained possession on the representation that they would complete the purchase, failed to pay the balance consideration, and thereafter threatened the persons claiming ownership.

The FIR was registered on 6 July 2023.

During the proceedings, the High Court and the Supreme Court granted opportunities to the petitioners to deposit 50% and subsequently the balance consideration, or alternatively vacate the property; the petitioners did not make the directed deposit but continued in possession.

Competing testamentary and title claims concerning the property remained pending before the competent courts.

Whether the allegations in FIR No. 414/2023, taken at face value, prima facie disclose the commission of offences under Sections 420 and 448 read with Section 34 IPC, so as to justify continuation of the investigation?

Whether the petitioners’ consensual entry into the property, part-payment of consideration, dispute regarding title, and asserted willingness to complete the transaction rendered the dispute purely civil and warranted quashing of the FIR under Section 482 CrPC?

Whether the disputed title, competing Wills, subsequent property transactions, and the petitioners’ failure to comply with directions to deposit the consideration could be conclusively determined in proceedings for quashing the FIR?

The Court applied the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, holding that an FIR may be quashed only in exceptional circumstances and within the recognised categories in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; investigation into a cognizable offence should ordinarily not be interdicted, as reiterated in Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401.

The Court relied on State of Karnataka v. Prabhu Shankar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1446, for the rule that the High Court cannot conduct a roving enquiry or mini-trial while deciding a quashing petition.

For cheating under Section 420 IPC, dishonest or fraudulent intention must exist at the time of inducement; a mere subsequent breach of contract is insufficient, as explained in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC 168.

However, the complaint need not reproduce every statutory ingredient verbatim if it discloses the factual foundation of the offence, as held in Rajesh Bajaj v. State (NCT of Delhi), (1999) 3 SCC 259.

The Court further held that a commercial or civil remedy does not bar criminal proceedings where the allegations independently disclose a cognizable offence, following Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983.

Under Sections 441 and 442 IPC, criminal trespass may include initially lawful entry followed by unlawful remaining on property with the requisite criminal intent; such trespass, when relating to a dwelling, constitutes house-trespass.

The Court held that the FIR could not be characterised merely as a complaint regarding non-payment of the balance sale consideration. The allegations that the petitioners represented an intention to purchase the property, obtained possession after issuing cheques and making only limited payment, thereafter failed to pay or vacate, and threatened the complainant and the alleged owner provided a prima facie factual foundation for investigating whether the representation was dishonest from the inception.

The disputed diamond payments, consensual initial entry, and objections concerning title were matters of defence and did not constitute unimpeachable material warranting quashing.

The fact that respondent No. 2’s own title or authority was disputed did not make the FIR inherently improbable, since he claimed to have acted as a property dealer for the person asserting ownership.

The petitioners’ continued possession despite repeated opportunities to deposit the consideration weakened their contention that the proceedings were abusive.

The competing Wills and title proceedings required adjudication by the competent civil or testamentary forums and could not be conclusively determined in a Section 482 proceeding.

Similarly, consensual initial entry did not rule out an offence under Section 448 IPC because the FIR alleged unlawful continued occupation after demand for payment or vacation, accompanied by threats; whether the continued occupation was unlawful and accompanied by the requisite intent required investigation.

Quashing the FIR would therefore require the Court to assess disputed facts and conduct a mini-trial, which was impermissible at the investigation stage.

The disputed title, competing testamentary claims, alleged payments, subsequent transactions, and the petitioners’ asserted defences could not be adjudicated in a quashing petition.

Accordingly, the petition seeking quashing of FIR No. 414/2023 and all proceedings emanating from it was dismissed.

Pending applications were disposed of, interim orders were vacated, and the Court clarified that its observations would not prejudice the investigation or the independent title, probate, review, recall, or contempt proceedings.