Dissenting members must submit consenting declarations but cannot be evicted until contractual preconditions for vacation are fulfilled.

The Petitioner (Developer) and Respondent No. 1 (Society) entered into a registered Development Agreement (DA) on March 31, 2025, for the redevelopment of a building constructed in 1975

While 32 out of 38 members consented, Respondent Nos. 2 to 11 ("dissenting members") refused to execute "Consenting Member Declarations" or vacate their flats

Under Clause 17 of the DA, the redevelopment was structured in stages: first, obtaining MDP IOD (Minimum Development Potential); second, obtaining Member Declarations; and third, obtaining Full IOD (Intimation of Disapproval) and loading full FSI before issuing a 45-day "Notice to Vacate"

The Petitioner obtained the MDP IOD on March 5, 2026, but the responding members challenged the petition as premature, arguing that the stage for physical eviction (Full IOD) had not yet been reached

1. Whether a developer can invoke Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, against dissenting members who are not signatories to the arbitration agreement

2. Whether the court can grant an interim order for physical possession/eviction before the specific contractual contingencies (Full IOD and Notice to Vacate) have occurred

The court applied Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, regarding interim measures

It relied on Girish Mulchand Mehta v. Mahesh S. Mehta, which established that dissenting members are bound by the collective decision of the Society’s General Body and that Section 9 reliefs can extend to such members to prevent obstruction of redevelopment

It distinguished the precedent in Space Master Realtors v. Mulund Sandhyaprakash CHS Ltd., noting that while non-signatories might not be referred to arbitration under Section 11, they remain subject to interim protective orders under Section 9 if they derive rights from the Society

The court also referenced Anita Enterprises v. Belfer Coop. Housing Society Ltd. regarding the supreme authority of the General Body in a cooperative structure

The Court reasoned that a cooperative society is a legal entity where the General Body's resolution binds all members, including dissenters

Regarding the first issue, it held that since the Petitioner had obtained the MDP IOD, the contractual stage under Clause 17.2—requiring members to submit declarations—had matured

Regarding the second issue, the Court found the prayer for eviction premature. It emphasized that Clause 17.4 specifically conditions the "Notice to Vacate" upon obtaining Full IOD and loading full FSI

The Court declined to skip these contractual stages, noting that interim relief must support the contract as written, not alter it

While the apprehension of future obstruction justifies protective orders (restraining third-party rights), it does not satisfy the "just and convenient" standard for appointing a Receiver to take physical possession when the trigger for eviction hasn't legally arrived

The Court directed Respondent Nos. 2 to 11 to execute and submit the Consenting Member Declarations within four weeks

It further granted an injunction restraining the dissenting members from creating any third-party rights or encumbering their flats pending arbitration

The Court rejected the prayers for immediate vacation of premises and the appointment of a Court Receiver as premature, holding that the obligation to hand over possession arises only after the Full IOD stage is completed. All contentions regarding FSI entitlement and supplementary proposals were kept open