Doubtful identification renders sole testimony insufficient for conviction; benefit of doubt must follow.

The appellant was prosecuted for allegedly entering the prosecutrix’s house at about 10:00–10:30 p.m. on 17 November 2013, when she was approximately 13 years old, and catching hold of her hand with the intention of outraging her modesty.

He allegedly fled after she raised an alarm. The FIR was registered on 18 November 2013, followed by investigation, seizure of the prosecutrix’s school-age record, and filing of the charge-sheet.

The trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 456 and 354(d) of the IPC and Section 8 of the POCSO Act; however, no separate sentence was imposed under Section 354(d) IPC because of the graver conviction under Section 8 POCSO.

The appellant was sentenced to three years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine under Sections 456 IPC and 8 POCSO, with the sentences directed to run concurrently.

In appeal under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C., the appellant challenged the reliability of the prosecutrix’s identification, relying upon the darkness at the scene, inconsistencies regarding the place of occurrence, and the absence of immediate disclosure of his name.

Whether the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age on the date of the incident, thereby attracting the POCSO Act?

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was the person who entered the house and caught hold of the prosecutrix’s hand?

Whether the appellant’s convictions under Sections 456 and 354(d) IPC and Section 8 of the POCSO Act could be sustained on the evidence led by the prosecution?

The Court applied Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. governing appeals against conviction by a Sessions Court.

Section 456 IPC concerns lurking house-trespass or house-breaking by night, while Section 354(d) IPC was charged in relation to the alleged act against the prosecutrix.

Section 8 of the POCSO Act prescribes punishment for sexual assault upon a child, and the applicability of the Act depends upon the victim being below 18 years of age.

The Court accepted the principle that a conviction may be based solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix where that testimony is wholly reliable and inspires confidence; however, where material circumstances create a reasonable doubt regarding identification or the occurrence, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

The prosecution bears the burden of proving the identity of the accused and the essential ingredients of the charged offences beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court accepted the school admission and removal register, supported by the Headmaster’s testimony, as establishing that the prosecutrix was born on 15 February 2000 and was below 18 years of age on the date of the incident.

However, it found the appellant’s identity insufficiently proved.

The prosecutrix admitted that the incident occurred in darkness and that she initially asked the person who he was and why he had come, creating doubt as to whether she had identified him during the occurrence.

There was also a material inconsistency regarding whether she was sleeping in the verandah or inside the house, and a purported eyewitness, Asha, was not examined.

PW-2, who arrived immediately after the prosecutrix shouted, stated that she could not see the fleeing person and that the prosecutrix had not disclosed his name to her.

The prosecutrix’s mother and aunt likewise stated that she had not immediately named the appellant.

Although the prosecutrix’s testimony could legally have supported a conviction if found wholly reliable, these inconsistencies, omissions, and the absence of immediate identification created a reasonable doubt.

The trial court therefore erred in relying principally upon her testimony without adequately assessing the surrounding circumstances and material contradictions.

The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 25 February 2014 were set aside.

The appellant was acquitted of the charges under Sections 456 and 354(d) IPC and Section 8 of the POCSO Act by extending to him the benefit of doubt.

As the appellant was on bail, his bail bonds were directed to remain operative for six months in terms of Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.