DPC may prescribe uniform minimum suitability benchmarks absent arbitrariness, discrimination, or statutory violation.

The petitioner, a 2014-batch directly recruited Deputy Superintendent of Police serving in the Senior Scale, had completed the requisite eight years of qualifying service and was eligible for consideration for posting as Additional Superintendent of Police under Rule 23 read with Schedule V of the Chhattisgarh Police Executive (Gazetted) Service Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2005.

The Departmental Promotion Committee (“DPC”), while considering eligible officers for the 2025 posting year, prescribed a minimum benchmark of 15 marks under the “Good” standard. The petitioner had four “Very Good” and one “Good” ACR gradings, aggregating 14 marks, and was consequently declared “not fit” for posting as Additional Superintendent of Police.

She challenged the benchmark as arbitrary, extraneous to the Rules, and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, seeking reconsideration and, if necessary, a review DPC.

Pursuant to the Court’s direction, the respondent authorities filed an affidavit explaining that the 15-mark benchmark had been fixed by the duly constituted DPC after considering the responsibilities of the higher post and the service records of eligible officers, and had been applied uniformly.

1. Whether the DPC was legally competent to prescribe a minimum benchmark of 15 marks for assessing suitability for posting as Additional Superintendent of Police, notwithstanding the absence of an express numerical benchmark in Rule 23 or Schedule V of the Rules, 2005.

2. Whether the petitioner’s declaration as “not fit” on securing 14 marks was arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide, or contrary to the governing service rules so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

3. Whether the petitioner had a vested right to be posted as Additional Superintendent of Police merely because she fulfilled the eligibility conditions under Rule 23 of the Rules, 2005.

Rule 23 of the Chhattisgarh Police Executive (Gazetted) Service Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2005 provides that members serving in the Senior Scale, Selection Grade, or Senior Selection Grade who satisfy the eligibility conditions in Schedule V are eligible for consideration for posting as Additional Superintendent of Police, with selection to be made by the prescribed committee.

Eligibility creates a right to consideration, not an indefeasible right to appointment or posting.

The DPC, as an expert body, may make an overall assessment of service records and ACRs and prescribe a reasonable minimum standard or benchmark, provided it is consistent with the governing rules, applied uniformly, and not arbitrary, discriminatory, biased, or mala fide.

Relying on Union of India v. A.K. Narula, (2007) 11 SCC 10, the Court held that judicial interference is justified only where the DPC’s assessment is vitiated by bias, mala fides, arbitrariness, or inconsistent application of standards.

Under B.V. Sivaiah v. K. Addanki Babu, (1998) 6 SCC 720, the competent authority may prescribe minimum standards and a mode of assessment for determining the requisite merit.

Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v. B.S. Mahajan, (1990) 1 SCC 305, further establishes that courts should not sit in appeal over the merits assessed by an expert Selection Committee, absent illegality, material procedural irregularity, or proved mala fides.

The Court distinguished eligibility from suitability. Although the petitioner satisfied the eligibility requirements under Rule 23, the DPC retained authority to assess whether she met the minimum standard for the higher posting.

The minutes expressly recorded a uniform minimum benchmark of “Good” with at least 15 marks, and the petitioner received 14 marks.

The Court accepted the respondents’ explanation that the benchmark was fixed after considering the nature and responsibilities of the post and was applied to all eligible officers.

The petitioner’s argument that her ACR combination should have qualified her, or that the benchmark was inconsistent with earlier practice and the 1974 circular, did not establish arbitrariness or illegality.

As no selective application, differential treatment, mala fides, bias, or violation of the Rules was demonstrated, the Court declined to substitute its assessment for that of the expert DPC.

The petitioner’s score of 14 marks justified the DPC’s conclusion that she was “not fit”; fulfilment of the eligibility conditions conferred only a right of consideration and not a right to posting.

Finding no arbitrariness, discrimination, mala fides, or violation of the governing rules, the Court dismissed the writ petition and declined to order reconsideration or a review DPC.