Dropping contempt proceedings does not exonerate an employee from departmental misconduct under the preponderance standard.

The petitioner, a Sub-Registrar, was subjected to departmental proceedings concerning the registration of land allegedly in breach of the Supreme Court’s interim direction dated 8 May 2014 that the company’s capital assets should not be disposed of without the Court’s permission.

An earlier punishment order was quashed by the Patna High Court in CWJC No. 5241 of 2018 because the petitioner’s reply to the second show-cause notice had not been objectively considered; the matter was remanded to the disciplinary authority from the stage of the second show-cause notice.

Pursuant thereto, a fresh second show-cause notice was issued, the petitioner submitted his reply, and the disciplinary authority imposed the penalty of withholding four increments with cumulative effect under Rule 14(vi) of the Bihar C.C.A. Rules, 2005, by Memo No. 3570 dated 24 September 2021.

The petitioner’s review petition was rejected on 12 January 2022.

Whether the dropping of contempt proceedings against the petitioner by the Supreme Court completely exonerated him from departmental misconduct arising out of the same conduct?

Whether the disciplinary authority lawfully imposed the penalty of withholding four increments with cumulative effect after reconsidering the matter from the stage of the second show-cause notice?

Whether the impugned punishment and rejection of review warranted interference under writ jurisdiction on the ground of procedural unfairness, violation of natural justice, or disproportionality?

The Court applied Rule 14(vi) of the Bihar C.C.A. Rules, 2005, which authorises withholding of increments as a departmental penalty.

It relied on the principle in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727, that where a disciplinary proceeding is vitiated at the stage of consideration of the second show-cause notice, the matter may be remitted for fresh consideration from that stage.

The Court distinguished contempt proceedings from departmental proceedings: contempt requires proof of deliberate and wilful disobedience, whereas departmental misconduct is established on the standard of preponderance of probabilities.

Dropping contempt proceedings, including on acceptance of an apology under Section 12(1) and its proviso of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, does not necessarily constitute complete exoneration from the underlying conduct for departmental purposes.

The Court found that the earlier remand order required only fresh consideration from the stage of the second show-cause notice and did not exonerate the petitioner from the underlying allegation.

The Supreme Court’s interim order expressly prohibited disposal of the company’s capital assets without its permission, yet the relevant land was registered shortly after legal advice was obtained, while the petitioner was functioning as Sub-Registrar.

The Court held that the Supreme Court’s dropping of contempt proceedings merely meant that the conduct had not been proved as deliberate and wilful disobedience sufficient for contempt; it did not prevent the disciplinary authority from examining whether the same conduct constituted departmental misconduct on a lower standard of proof.

The petitioner’s affidavit and admission in the contempt proceedings constituted relevant material, and proof of the underlying conduct afresh through witnesses was not indispensable.

Since the disciplinary authority reconsidered the matter after issuing a fresh second show-cause notice and the preponderance of probabilities supported responsibility for the disobedience, the punishment was held legally sustainable.

The punishment of withholding four increments with cumulative effect was found to be in accordance with law, and no ground for writ interference was established.

Accordingly, the writ petition challenging the punishment order dated 24 September 2021 and the review order dated 12 January 2022 was dismissed.