Dying declaration corroborated by medical evidence justifies conviction; sentence reduced to Section 304 Part-II for non-premeditated act.

The appellant, Pawan Kumar, was accused of entering the complainant’s house on April 2, 2008, through a neighbor’s roof, scuffling with the victim (Kanchan, aged 16), and setting her ablaze using kerosene

The victim was admitted to District Hospital, Etawah, where her dying declaration was recorded by a Tehsildar

She was later transferred to Kanpur, where she died of septicemia resulting from burn injuries seven days after the incident

The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 302 (murder), 452 (house-trespass), and 354 (outraging modesty) of the IPC

The appellant challenged the conviction, arguing that the death due to septicemia after seven days should not be classified as murder and that the outraging modesty charge was unproven

The court applied Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act regarding the admissibility of dying declarations, relying on Laxman v. State of Maharashtra to establish that a certificate of mental fitness is a rule of prudence, not an absolute necessity if the statement is otherwise reliable

For the distinction between murder and culpable homicide, the court applied Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC, using the framework from Anbazhagan v. State to determine if "intention" or "knowledge" of death was present

Section 304 Part-II was applied for acts done with the knowledge that death is likely but without the specific premeditated intention to murder

The court found the dying declaration (Ex. Ka-10) highly reliable as it was recorded within 2.5 hours of the incident after a medical fitness certification

However, it found the testimony of P.W.2 (the brother) doubtful, as the victim's own declaration did not mention his presence during the act or the fire-extinguishing efforts

Crucially, the court noted that the dying declaration mentioned a "scuffle" rather than "molestation," leading to the acquittal under Section 354

Regarding the nature of the offense, the court observed there was no evidence of prior enmity or premeditation and that the death resulted from septicemia seven days post-incident

Applying the principle that the act was a result of a sudden scuffle where the appellant had "knowledge" but not "premeditated intention" to kill, the court determined the offense fell under Section 304 Part-II IPC rather than Section 302

The appellant was acquitted of the charge under Section 354 IPC

The conviction under Section 452 IPC (7 years) was affirmed. Given that the appellant had already served over 18 years in jail—exceeding the modified sentence and default imprisonment—the court ordered his immediate release