Dying declaration recorded by Magistrate with doctor's fitness certification prevails over hostile testimony of ocular witnesses.

On November 16, 2017, the victim, Sanno, sustained 95% thermal burns and subsequently died on November 30, 2017.

The FIR was lodged by the deceased’s mother (PW-1) alleging that the husband (Suhail), father-in-law (Tufail), and other in-laws set Sanno on fire due to childlessness and unmet dowry demands for a four-wheeler.

A dying declaration was recorded by the Naib Tehsildar (PW-11) on November 17, 2017, wherein Sanno implicated Suhail, citing his illicit relationship with a sister-in-law and her inability to conceive as motives.

While the Trial Court acquitted most relatives, it convicted Suhail under Sections 302 and 498A IPC, and Tufail under Section 498A IPC.

The appellants challenged these convictions on grounds that witnesses turned hostile and the dying declaration was unreliable given the 95% burn injuries.

1. Whether a dying declaration can form the sole basis of conviction when the declarant has suffered 95% burns and prosecution witnesses of fact have turned hostile.

2. Whether the conduct of the accused post-incident (fleeing the scene) can be used to negate a plea of accidental fire.

3. Whether the conviction of the father-in-law (Tufail) under Section 498A is sustainable when evidence suggests he resided in a separate house.

The Court applied Section 302 (Murder) and Section 498A (Cruelty) of the IPC.

The Court relied on the Constitution Bench decision in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, establishing that a doctor’s certificate of "consciousness" is sufficient and a specific "fitness of mind" certification is not a mandatory legal requirement if the court is satisfied the statement was voluntary.

The Court applied principles from Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat regarding the reliability of Executive Magistrates.

The Court applied Krishna Kumar @ Pamma v. State of Haryana, which held that the conduct of an accused fleeing the scene rather than aiding the victim suggests homicidal intent rather than an accident.

The Court found the dying declaration (Exhibit Ka-13) truthful, voluntary, and free from tutoring, as no relatives were present during its recording.

Despite the 95% burns, the medical certification by PW-12 confirmed the victim was "conscious and able to speak," which satisfied the rule of prudence defined in Laxman.

The Court rejected the defense’s "accidental fire" theory (caused by a falling kerosene lamp), noting that Suhail’s failure to assist his wife or report the matter—choosing instead to flee—was inconsistent with innocence and pointed toward a homicidal act.

Regarding Tufail, the Court observed from the site plan (Exhibit Ka-5) and the Investigating Officer's testimony (PW-8) that Tufail resided in a separate house from the hut where the incident occurred.

No specific evidence of cruelty by Tufail was found in the dying declaration or the record once the ocular witnesses turned hostile.

The Court dismissed Suhail’s appeal (No. 1401 of 2020), affirming his conviction and life sentence under Section 302 IPC.

The Court allowed Tufail’s appeal (No. 1007 of 2020), acquitting him of charges under Section 498A IPC due to a lack of evidence regarding his involvement and his separate residence.

Tufail was ordered to be released and his bail bonds cancelled.