Education exemption applies to qualifying curriculum-based services even when provided by an entity other than the university.

The appellant, a service-tax-registered company, was found through third-party information received from the Income Tax Department to have earned differential income of ₹1,21,31,141 during FY 2015–16. The Department issued a show-cause notice proposing service-tax demand of ₹17,59,015 under the extended period under Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994, along with interest and penalties under Sections 77(1)(c) and 78. The adjudicating authority confirmed the demand and penalties after the appellant neither replied to the notice nor attended the personal hearing.

The Commissioner (Appeals) partly upheld the demand, leading to the present appeal. The disputed receipts included ₹3,14,000 received from Globsyn Skills Development Pvt. Ltd. for PMKVY/NSDC-related skill-development courses and ₹2,31,886 received from Sahitya Sadawart Samiti for distance-learning and degree-related courses conducted in connection with Suresh Gyan Vihar University.

Whether the appellant was entitled to exemption under paragraph 9A(iv) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST for skill-development services rendered through Globsyn Skills Development Pvt. Ltd., an NSDC-approved training partner?

Whether the appellant’s education and distance-learning services connected with Suresh Gyan Vihar University were exempt under Section 66D(l)(ii) of the Finance Act, 1994?

Whether the extended limitation period under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 could be invoked in the absence of wilful suppression, fraud, or intent to evade service tax?

Paragraph 9A(iv) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST exempts services provided by an NSDC-approved training partner or other specified entities in relation to specified NSDC programmes and schemes. Applying the strict-interpretation principle for exemption notifications, the Tribunal relied on Commissioner of Customs v. Dilip Kumar and Company, which places the burden on the assessee to establish that its case falls within the exemption and resolves ambiguity in favour of the Revenue.

Section 66D(l)(ii) of the Finance Act, 1994 places education forming part of a curriculum for obtaining a qualification recognised by law in the negative list. For extended limitation, Section 73(1) requires fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade tax; mere non-payment or non-disclosure is insufficient. The Tribunal relied on Uniworth Textiles Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Anand Nishikawa v. Commissioner of Central Excise for this principle.

The Tribunal held that the appellant was not itself an NSDC-approved training partner. The NSDC certificate recognised Globsyn as the approved training partner, while the appellant was described only as an authorised partner or learning centre appointed through Globsyn. Since paragraph 9A(iv) specifically refers to a training partner approved by the NSDC or Sector Skill Council, and there was no tripartite agreement or direct authorisation comparable to the arrangement considered in SRK Innovative School of Information, the exemption was denied for the ₹3,14,000 receipt.

However, for the ₹2,31,886 received from Sahitya Sadawart Samiti, the Tribunal found that Section 66D(l)(ii) does not require the education to be provided directly by a university. Since the services related to education forming part of a curriculum leading to qualifications recognised by law, the appellant was entitled to the negative-list exemption.

On limitation, the Tribunal noted that the original demand of ₹17,59,015 was reduced to ₹81,843 after the appellant’s documents were considered. This demonstrated that the issue arose from an interpretational and documentary dispute rather than deliberate suppression with intent to evade tax; therefore, the extended period was unsustainable.

The demand relating to services provided to Sahitya Sadawart Samiti was set aside because the services were covered by Section 66D(l)(ii).

The invocation of the extended period was also set aside, and the impugned order was modified accordingly.