Election petitions are the exclusive remedy for challenging Panchayat elections on grounds of educational disqualification.

The petitioner and Respondent No. 7 (R-7) were elected as Members of the No. 2 Fekamari Anchalik Panchayat, after which R-7 was elected as President.

The petitioner challenged R-7's election, alleging that R-7 failed to meet the minimum educational qualification (HSSLC or equivalent) required under Section 111(2)(c) of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994, and had submitted forged certificates.

R-7 raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition, asserting that under Article 243-O of the Constitution and Section 129(b) of the Act, an election can only be challenged via an election petition before the designated Tribunal.

1. Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable to challenge a Panchayat election based on educational disqualification in light of the constitutional bar under Article 243-O and the statutory remedy of an election petition.

2. Whether the absence of a prescribed administrative procedure for educational disqualification under Rule 62(2) of the Assam Panchayat (Constitution) Rules, 1995, permits the High Court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226.

Article 243-O of the Constitution, which bars judicial interference in electoral matters except through an election petition.

Section 129(b) of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994, which mandates that no election shall be questioned except by an election petition presented within sixty days to the Tribunal.

Rule 62 of the Assam Panchayat (Constitution) Rules, 1995, noting that while it prescribes procedures for disqualifications related to family size, sanitation, and child marriage, it provides no such procedure for educational disqualification.

The Supreme Court's holding in Sandeep Singh Bora v. Narendra Singh Deopa (2026), which affirmed that Article 243-O creates an express constitutional embargo against Article 226 jurisdiction in election matters where a statutory remedy exists.

The court reasoned that Rule 62 of the 1995 Rules distinguishes between different types of disqualification. While the District Commissioner has the authority to adjudicate subsequent disqualifications regarding children, toilets, or child marriage, no such administrative jurisdiction is granted for educational qualification disputes under Rule 62(2).

Therefore, any dispute regarding the validity of a candidate's educational credentials at the time of nomination constitutes a challenge to the "election" itself.

Following the principle in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, the court held that when a statute provides a specific method (an election petition) for redressal, all other methods are forbidden.

Additionally, the court found that the petitioner’s allegations involved disputed questions of fact regarding forged documents, which require the adducing of evidence and cross-examination—tasks unsuitable for a writ court under Article 226.

To ensure the petitioner was not left remediless due to the passage of time, the court granted liberty to file an election petition and directed that the period spent pursuing the writ (from 10.11.2025 to 27.03.2026) be excluded from the 60-day limitation period.

The court expressed no opinion on the merits of the fraud allegations and vacated all interim orders.