Employer cannot rely on administrative delay in processing medical retirement to deny compassionate appointment benefits.

Appellant No. 2, an employee of the Respondent-company, applied for voluntary retirement on medical grounds on 22.07.2015.

He submitted a certificate from a Civil Surgeon certifying permanent incapacitation.

At the time of application, he was 54 years old.

Despite two reminders sent before he turned 55 on 10.12.2015, the Respondent remained silent.

Only on 03.02.2016 (after the age threshold) did the Respondent demand a Medical Board certificate, which the Appellant provided within seven days.

The Respondent accepted the retirement on 31.05.2016 but rejected Appellant No. 1’s (the son's) claim for compassionate appointment on 15.07.2019, citing that the employee had retired after the age of 55.

The High Court of Bombay upheld this rejection.

The Court applied Clause 1.1 of the Scheme for Compassionate Appointment in Public Sector General Insurance Companies, which requires medical incapacitation before age 55 to be certified by a Medical Board.

It relied on Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana regarding the humanitarian object of compassionate appointment to tide over financial crises.

Bhawani Prasad Sonkar v. Union of India, which emphasizes that while schemes must be strictly construed, they must be administered fairly.

The Court applied the principle from Malaya Nanda Sethy v. State of Orissa that applicants should not suffer due to "absolute callousness" or delay by authorities.

The equitable maxim from Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar that a party cannot take advantage of its own wrong or default.

The Court reasoned that while Clause 1.1 specifies "is retired" before age 55, it cannot be interpreted to allow an employer to control eligibility through "delayed processing".

The Appellant acted with diligence by applying and providing a Government medical certificate four months before the deadline.

The Respondent’s failure to communicate the specific deficiency (the need for a Medical Board vs. a Civil Surgeon certificate) until after the age threshold was crossed constituted a default in duty.

The Court held that a technical construction of the Scheme would place beneficial provisions at the mercy of administrative delay, thereby defeating the fairness inherent in such schemes.

Since the Appellant complied with the Medical Board requirement immediately upon request, the delay was attributable solely to the Respondent.

It held that the Respondent could not rely on the age-bar because the timely application was frustrated by its own inaction.

The Court directed the Respondent to grant compassionate appointment to Appellant No. 1 within eight weeks.

It further ordered age relaxation if Appellant No. 1 had crossed the upper age limit during the litigation and directed the payment of any unpaid dues to Appellant No. 2.

Appellant No. 1 is entitled to monetary benefits only from the date of actual appointment.