Excise Inspectors lack statutory authority to issue liquor-vend notices under Section 4 of the Excise Act.

The dispute concerned Temporary Licence No. 60255/300/2026-27 dated 13 April 2026, issued by the Excise Commissioner, Jammu in favour of Ankit Gupta for operating a liquor vend from a shop situated at Pathwal, Dayala Chack, Kathua.

Pawan Khajuria, the shop owner, had executed a rent deed dated 11 March 2026 in favour of Gupta for a monthly rent of ₹25,000, expressly permitting liquor business; he subsequently sought cancellation of the tenancy after objections from family members, relatives and neighbours.

Khajuria challenged the licence on the grounds that the premises were within 50 metres of a place of worship and that the proposed vend violated applicable distance restrictions.

Gupta separately challenged the Excise Inspector’s notice dated 18 March 2026 directing submission of a revised site plan on the ground that the premises did not conform to Supreme Court and High Court directions concerning liquor vends near National Highways.

The official respondents maintained that the licence had been granted after scrutiny and physical verification, but also contended that the premises could not be used because of applicable highway-distance norms.

During the proceedings, the Court had directed maintenance of status quo regarding the vend site.

1. Whether the shop owner, having knowingly leased the premises for the purpose of carrying on a liquor business, could challenge the liquor licence on the ground that the premises were proximate to a place of worship.

2. Whether the notice dated 18 March 2026 directing the licensee to submit a revised site plan was vague and legally unsustainable for failure to identify the specific Supreme Court or High Court directions allegedly violated.

3. Whether an Excise Inspector possessed statutory authority under Section 4 of the J&K Excise Act, 1958, to issue the impugned notice, either independently or on the oral instructions of an Excise and Taxation Officer.

The Court applied Section 4 of the J&K Excise Act, 1958, which authorises the Government to appoint the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioners and Excise and Taxation Officers and empowers those officers to exercise statutory powers and perform duties conferred by the Act.

The Court held that the expression “the officers so appointed” in Section 4(1) refers to the officers specifically enumerated in that provision and does not extend to an Excise Inspector.

It further applied the principle that administrative actions affecting legal rights must be founded on legally authorised and recorded exercise of power, and cannot rest merely on oral instructions.

The applicable J&K Excise Policy, 2026–27, including Clause 2.3.10 governing relocation or shifting of a vend, and the Supreme Court’s directions concerning distance restrictions for liquor vends near National and State Highways, were also relevant to the licensing dispute.

The Court additionally applied the principle that a person who knowingly creates a contractual arrangement for a particular use cannot subsequently challenge that use on a ground personally inconsistent with the arrangement.

The Court held that Khajuria could not maintain his challenge to the vend on the ground of proximity to a place of worship because he had consciously leased the premises for liquor business, with his son acting as an attesting witness to the rent agreement.

However, the legality of Gupta’s proposed location under highway-distance norms remained a separate statutory issue.

The notice dated 18 March 2026 did not identify the particular Supreme Court or High Court direction allegedly breached and was therefore vague and lacking necessary particulars.

More importantly, Section 4 did not confer the relevant statutory authority upon an Excise Inspector; the Department’s reliance on the phrase “officers so appointed” to include an Excise Inspector was misconceived.

The purported issuance of the notice pursuant to oral instructions from an Excise and Taxation Officer could not cure the jurisdictional defect, since administrative action affecting legal rights cannot be based on oral directions.

It quashed the notice dated 18 March 2026 issued by the Excise Inspector for want of competence and because it was vague.

The competent authority was left at liberty to issue a fresh notice to the licensee in accordance with law, specifically identifying the alleged violations of the Supreme Court’s guidelines or directions governing liquor vends and thereafter proceeding under the applicable statutory provisions and rules.

Both writ petitions were accordingly disposed of.