Excluding Shiksha Mitras from the special TET for pre-existing in-service teachers is not discriminatory.

The 221 petitioners, who were working as Shiksha Mitras in Uttar Pradesh, challenged the Government Order dated 2 September 2026 and the consequential notification dated 3 September 2026, insofar as they limited eligibility for the Special Teacher Eligibility Test (Special TET) to specified categories of in-service teachers and excluded Shiksha Mitras.

The respondents contended that the Special TET implemented the Supreme Court’s directions concerning in-service teachers required to acquire TET, and that the petitioners could have taken the regular TET conducted in July 2026.

The High Court heard the matter with the parties’ consent.

Whether excluding Shiksha Mitras from the Special TET, while permitting specified in-service teachers to appear, violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Whether the petitioners could claim inclusion in the Special TET on the basis that they performed teaching functions and were otherwise eligible for the regular TET.

Section 23 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, read with the NCTE notification dated 23 August 2010, makes TET a prescribed qualification for teachers covered by the statutory regime.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra and its subsequent review order required the relevant in-service teachers to acquire TET within the extended period and directed periodic examinations to provide an opportunity to comply.

Under Article 14, reasonable classification is permissible where it rests on an intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the measure’s object; Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity among persons similarly situated in public employment.

A qualifying examination does not, by itself, confer a right to appointment.

The Court treated the Special TET as a transitional compliance measure for teachers already in service who became subject to the TET requirement after entering service—not as a recruitment process or a general opportunity for all candidates.

It found that Shiksha Mitras’ separate mode and legal framework of engagement distinguished them from pre-existing regular Assistant Teachers, notwithstanding similarities in teaching duties.

The classification therefore had a rational connection to enabling the identified in-service teachers to meet the subsequent qualification requirement within the time allowed by the Supreme Court.

The petitioners’ asserted eligibility for regular TET did not make them similarly situated for the purpose of this special examination.

The Court also noted their reported opportunity to take the regular TET, while clarifying that non-participation in that examination was not, by itself, decisive of the constitutional challenge.

The writ petition was dismissed, with no order as to costs.