Executing Court cannot dismiss a third-party obstruction petition at the SR stage without adjudicating independent title.

The petitioner filed an application under Order XXI Rule 97 of the CPC to obstruct the execution of a decree obtained by the respondents in 2006 regarding property in Survey Nos. 13/1A and 14 of Kolathur Village.

The petitioner claimed independent title and possession for over three decades over an 880 sq. ft. house within the suit property, asserting the land was government poramboke.

The Executing Court (X Assistant City Civil Court, Chennai) dismissed the application at the SR (numbering) stage without a hearing, relying on a previous High Court order involving different parties who claimed under the judgment debtors.

The petitioner challenged this summary dismissal via a Civil Revision Petition.

1. Whether the Executing Court was justified in dismissing an application filed under Order XXI Rule 97 of the CPC at the SR (numbering) stage without conducting an enquiry.

2. Whether an obstructor claiming independent title (not through the judgment debtor) is entitled to adduce evidence to establish such right during execution proceedings.

Order XXI Rule 97 of the CPC, which mandates that all questions, including those relating to right, title, or interest in the property arising between the parties to the proceeding or an obstructor, must be determined by the Executing Court and not by a separate suit.

The court may require evidence to decide if an obstructor is bound by a decree, as held in Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust (1998) 3 SCC 723.

A third party’s right to adjudication of independent claims is confirmed by Shreenath v. Rajesh AIR 1998 SC 1827.

Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi (2021) 6 SCC 418 cautions against mechanical notices but does not foreclose the right to evidence in bona fide independent claims.

The High Court reasoned that while the decree-holders had been unable to enjoy the fruits of their 2006 decree for two decades, such delay cannot justify bypassing statutory procedures.

The court distinguished the petitioner from previous obstructors; while the latter claimed through judgment debtors (settled in previous litigations), the current petitioner asserted a primary independent right and possession.

The Court found that by dismissing the application at the SR stage, the Executing Court "virtually shut out the valuable rights of the petitioner" to lead oral and documentary evidence.

The Court noted that under Order XXI Rule 97, the Executing Court acts as a trial court, and a roving enquiry at the numbering stage is improper when factual disputes regarding independent title are raised.

The Court held that the application under Order XXI Rule 97 must be numbered and decided on its merits after giving the respondents an opportunity to file a counter.

The Executing Court was directed to dispose of the application within three months, with the scope of enquiry strictly limited to the 880 sq. ft. claimed by the petitioner, without reopening the overall validity of the original decree.