Execution court cannot modify or enlarge the scope of a decree.

The applicant's father, Ali Mohammad Rather, a permanent employee of the respondents' department, died in harness on July 25, 1984.

In August 1984, the applicant applied for compassionate appointment under SRO-194.

The department processed the application, as evidenced by communications from February 1991 and July 1991.

Due to a lack of progress, the applicant filed a civil suit for declaration and mandatory injunction.

The suit was decreed ex parte on July 30, 2003, directing the respondents to consider the applicant's case for compassionate appointment under SRO-43.

The respondents did not contest the suit and were proceeded against ex parte in the executing proceedings.

An application by Judgment Debtor No. 3 to set aside the ex parte judgment was rejected on September 21, 2007, with a direction to implement the decree.

Another order on October 18, 2012, again directed implementation, rejecting a statement of facts claiming compliance.

The execution proceedings were subsequently transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal.

The respondents rejected the applicant's claim on January 31, 2014, under SRO-43, citing lack of requisite qualification (8th standard instead of matriculation) and the claim becoming stale due to delay (suit filed 17 years after father's death).

1. Whether the applicant, having sought and obtained a decree for consideration under SRO-43, can subsequently demand consideration under SRO-194 in execution proceedings?

2. Whether the respondents' rejection of the applicant's claim for compassionate appointment on the grounds of lack of requisite qualification and delay, in compliance with the decree to consider under SRO-43, constitutes a valid discharge of the decree?

The court applied the principle that eligibility for compassionate appointment is determined by the rules in force on the date the cause of action arises.

It recognized that new rules generally cannot operate retrospectively to extinguish accrued rights under repealed rules, provided no acquiescence or delay is attributable to the claimant.

However, the Tribunal emphasized the doctrine of election, stating that a party cannot approbate and reprobate by specifically choosing a remedy under one legal framework (SRO-43) and then seeking to revert to another (SRO-194).

Crucially, the Tribunal affirmed the settled principle that an executing court cannot travel beyond the terms of the decree or enlarge its scope.

Furthermore, it affirmed that compassionate appointment cannot be granted after a considerable period, where the element of urgent financial need no longer subsists.

The conditions under SRO-43 of 1994, particularly regarding qualifications for Class IV posts (matriculation or acquiring it within one year) and the one-year limitation for application, were also central to the analysis.

The court found that while the cause of action arose in 1984 under SRO-194, the applicant deliberately pursued and obtained an ex parte decree specifically directing consideration under SRO-43.

This constituted a conscious election of remedy, precluding him from now seeking consideration under SRO-194.

The Tribunal cannot exceed the scope of the original decree, which specifically mandated consideration under SRO-43.

The respondents considered the applicant's case under SRO-43 as per the decree, finding him ineligible due to failing to meet the matriculation qualification for a Class IV post and not acquiring it within the stipulated one-year period.

The court noted the applicant's admitted 8th-standard qualification and the significant delay of 17 years in filing the suit after his father's death, which made the claim stale as the element of urgent financial need would no longer exist.

Therefore, the rejection by the respondents was deemed consistent with the qualified direction of the decree and the governing rules.

The rejection was upheld due to the applicant's lack of requisite qualification under SRO-43 and the inordinate delay in pursuing the claim, rendering it stale.

The Tribunal held that it could not travel beyond the decree or direct consideration under SRO-194 given the applicant's election of remedy.

Accordingly, the execution proceedings were closed, and the execution petition was dismissed.