Execution of a decree for mandatory injunction must be sought within three years.

The respondent-plaintiff instituted O.S. No. 339 of 2008 seeking declaration of ownership, consequential permanent injunction restraining the defendant from making further construction or interfering with possession, and mandatory injunction directing removal of an unlawful construction.

The Trial Court partly decreed the suit on 23 December 2016, granting the declaration and mandatory injunction and directing removal of the construction within three months, i.e., by 23 March 2017.

The decree in O.S. No. 339 of 2008 was not challenged and consequently became final.

The petitioner did not remove the construction.

The respondent subsequently filed E.P. No. 50 of 2024, stated to have been filed on 17 April 2023, to enforce the mandatory injunction.

The petitioner contended that the execution petition was barred by limitation under Article 135 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The Executing Court nevertheless allowed the execution petition, leading to the present revision under Section 115 CPC.

Whether an execution petition seeking enforcement of a decree for mandatory injunction was barred by the three-year limitation period prescribed under Article 135 of the Limitation Act, 1963?

Whether the presence of a decree for consequential permanent injunction enabled the decree-holder to rely on Article 136 of the Limitation Act and execute the mandatory injunction without limitation, applying the principle in M.A. Raja v. S. Vedhantham Pillai?

Whether the Executing Court’s order allowing E.P. No. 50 of 2024 was liable to be set aside?

The Court applied Article 135 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a three-year limitation period for execution of a decree granting a mandatory injunction; the period begins when the decree becomes enforceable, subject to any time expressly granted by the decree for compliance.

Article 136 applies to execution of decrees other than decrees granting mandatory injunctions and does not remove the specific limitation prescribed by Article 135 where the execution sought is solely for mandatory relief.

The Court also referred to Order XXI Rule 32 CPC, under which a decree for injunction may be enforced in cases of disobedience.

In M.A. Raja v. S. Vedhantham Pillai, 2000 (II) CTC 199, this Court held, on its facts, that where mandatory relief formed part of a continuing decree for permanent injunction concerning a continuing obstruction, execution could be treated as enforcement of the perpetual injunction and was not barred by limitation.

However, that principle does not apply where the decree separately directs removal of an existing construction within a specified time and the execution petition seeks only enforcement of that mandatory direction.

The decree dated 23 December 2016 granted a specific mandatory injunction requiring removal of the unlawful construction within three months.

The period for compliance expired on 23 March 2017; therefore, under Article 135, the execution petition had to be filed within three years, on or before 22 March 2020.

Since the execution petition was filed only on 17 April 2023, it was prima facie beyond limitation.

The Court rejected the respondent’s reliance on M.A. Raja, distinguishing that case as one involving a continuing obstruction to the use of a pathway, where permanent and mandatory injunctions operated together as a continuing decree.

In the present case, the permanent injunction restraining future construction and interference was distinct from the mandatory injunction directing removal of an already existing construction.

Consequently, the mandatory relief was governed by Article 135.

The Court nevertheless clarified that, if the decree also contained a valid consequential permanent injunction, any subsequent violation of that injunction could be enforced through fresh execution proceedings, without the limitation applicable to the original mandatory relief.

The decision in M.A. Raja did not apply because the present decree separately granted mandatory relief for removal of an existing construction, rather than treating the relief as part of a continuing permanent injunction.

Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition was allowed, the order dated 15 September 2025 in E.P. No. 50 of 2024 was set aside, and the connected miscellaneous petition was closed without costs.

The respondent was left at liberty to enforce any independently granted permanent injunction in appropriate fresh execution proceedings in the event of a subsequent violation.