Explained delay in reporting sexual assault does not undermine credible, medically corroborated child-victim testimony.

The appellant was prosecuted for allegedly committing penetrative sexual assault on a seven-year-old girl, his relative, on 19 August 2019 after luring her to his house on the promise of chocolates. The victim returned home crying and bleeding from her private parts and narrated the incident to her mother. She was taken to FAAMCH, Barpeta, on 20 August 2019 and remained admitted for approximately two to three days. The FIR was lodged on 22 August 2019, with the delay attributed to the victim’s medical treatment.

The victim consistently testified that the appellant had inserted his penis into her vagina. Her mother and other witnesses deposed regarding the victim’s disclosure and the bleeding and pain suffered by her.

The medical officer examined the victim on 21 and 26 August 2019 and found swollen and tender genitalia and a recent tear in the hymen with oozing blood; the findings were opined to be suggestive of recent forceful penetration.

The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 376 IPC and Section 4(2) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“POCSO Act”), sentencing him under Section 4(2) of the POCSO Act to rigorous imprisonment for 20 years and a fine of ₹10,000.

1. Whether the testimony of the child victim, corroborated by the medical evidence, established penetrative sexual assault beyond reasonable doubt despite alleged inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence?

2. Whether the three-day delay in lodging the FIR and the discrepancy concerning the dates of medical examination created reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution case?

3. Whether the defence claim that the appellant was falsely implicated because of a land dispute was sufficient to rebut the prosecution case and the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act?

4. Whether the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court warranted appellate interference?

The Court applied Sections 3 and 4(2) of the POCSO Act, which criminalise penetrative sexual assault, with aggravated punishment where the child falls within the statutory age category, read with Section 376 IPC.

Section 29 of the POCSO Act requires the Court to presume the commission of the offence and the requisite mental state once the foundational facts of the prosecution case are established, subject to rebuttal by the accused.

The Court held that the credible testimony of a prosecutrix may, in an appropriate case, form the basis of conviction without independent corroboration, particularly where it is supported by medical evidence. It further applied the principle that minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies do not discredit an otherwise reliable prosecution case.

Relying on State of H.P. v. Gian Chand, (2001) 6 SCC 71; State of U.P. v. Manoj Kumar Pandey, (2009) 1 SCC 72; Deepak v. State of Haryana, (2015) 4 SCC 762; and State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384, the Court held that delay in reporting sexual offences, particularly offences against children, may be reasonably explained by medical treatment, trauma, family concerns, or the victim’s relationship with the accused.

The Court distinguished the principle in Debraj Dutta v. State of West Bengal & Anr., SLP (Crl.) No. 16838/2025, because the present case contained an explanation for the delay and the child’s testimony was found reliable and medically corroborated.

The Court found the victim’s evidence to be consistent on the material fact of penetration: she stated that the appellant lured her to his house, placed her on a bed, and inserted his penis into her vagina.

Her immediate disclosure to her mother, complaints of severe pain and difficulty in urination, bleeding, and subsequent hospitalisation supported her account.

The medical findings of swollen and tender genitalia and a recent hymenal tear with blood oozing were considered corroborative of recent forceful penetration, notwithstanding the absence of spermatozoa or other external injuries.

The discrepancy regarding medical examination on 21 and 26 August 2019 did not undermine the prosecution case because the medical findings remained consistent with the victim’s account and the defence did not establish any alternative cause for the injuries.

The three-day delay in lodging the FIR was reasonably explained by the victim’s treatment and hospitalisation, and the Court held that the welfare and medical care of a seven-year-old rape victim would naturally take priority over immediate reporting.

The alleged land dispute was rejected as an afterthought because it was unsupported by documentary or other credible evidence and had not been put to the prosecution witnesses through relevant cross-examination.

The Court treated the discrepancies in the statements of PW-1, PW-4 and PW-5 as minor and non-material, observing that they did not affect the core prosecution case or discredit the victim.

Once the prosecution established the foundational facts of penetrative sexual assault, the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act arose, and the appellant’s blanket denial failed to rebut it.

The delay in lodging the FIR, the dual medical examinations, minor evidentiary discrepancies, and the unsupported land-dispute theory did not create reasonable doubt.

The conviction under Section 376 IPC and Section 4(2) of the POCSO Act, and the sentence of 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹10,000, were upheld.

The appeal was dismissed, and the Trial Court Record was directed to be returned.