Export Promotion Council performing public regulatory functions is "State" under Article 12 and amenable to writ jurisdiction.

The Petitioner, a senior officer of the Council for Leather Exports (CLE), was on deputation as Secretary, Central Waqf Council (CWC) and later Joint Director at National Book Trust (NBT).

Upon premature repatriation from NBT on May 29, 2018, CLE refused to allow the Petitioner to physically join but began paying his salary following an order by the Delhi High Court in a connected petition.

On March 1, 2019, CLE issued a charge-sheet containing seven articles: Articles I-V related to alleged financial irregularities during his CWC tenure, while Articles VI-VII concerned his "agitation" against repatriation and alleged discourtesy.

The Petitioner was placed under suspension on April 15, 2019.

He challenged the charge-sheet and suspension, while CLE raised a preliminary objection that it is not "State" under Article 12 and thus not amenable to writ jurisdiction.

The Court applied the "functional, financial, and administrative control" test from Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology to determine "State" status.

It relied on Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, noting that corporate form does not shield an entity from Article 12.

Regarding writ maintainability against private bodies performing public duties, it applied Ramakrishna Mission v. Kago Kunya.

It distinguishes Dr. Jitarani Udgata v. Union of India by emphasizing CLE's specific role in compulsory export registration.

For suspension, it applied Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India, which prohibits prolonged, non-reasoned, or punitive suspensions.

The principle that a parent department retains disciplinary control over a deputationist was drawn from State of Punjab v. Inder Singh.

The Court found CLE to be an instrumentality of the State because it performs a public function (compulsory registration of leather exporters under the Foreign Trade Policy), and its Articles of Association empower the Government to issue binding directives under Article 76.

The Court noted that a prior Madras High Court decision had already identified CLE as a State instrumentality.

On the merits of Articles I-V, the Court held that while CLE retains disciplinary power over a deputationist, it must ensure procedural fairness by providing documents from the borrowing department (CWC) that are relevant to the petitioner's defense, especially regarding ministerial approvals.

Regarding Articles VI-VII, the Court found them "internally inconsistent" and "unsustainable" because CLE had blocked the Petitioner's physical joining; thus, it could not charge him for failing to join.

Finally, the suspension was deemed invalid as it was mechanical, lacked reasons for necessity, and had become punitive due to the passage of time and the fact that records were already secured by public authorities.

It partially allowed the petition by: (i) Quashing Articles VI and VII of the charge-sheet; (ii) Setting aside the suspension order dated April 15, 2019; and (iii) Ordering the release of differential salary and allowances within six weeks.

The Court permitted the disciplinary inquiry to continue solely regarding Articles I-V, subject to strict directions to provide the Petitioner with necessary CWC/Ministry records and a requirement for the disciplinary authority to pass a reasoned order on the Petitioner’s specific jurisdictional and approval-based defenses.

The Petitioner is deemed to have joined CLE service as of July 9, 2018.