Expressly reserved pathway rights prevent purchasers from claiming exclusive ownership of the access road.

The plaintiffs claimed exclusive ownership of the “B” Schedule property, which they had acquired through several sale deeds to provide access to their “A” Schedule property. The deeds contained covenants permitting the vendors to use the land for access to the lake, cattle bathing, and irrigation, and restricting the plaintiffs from obstructing the property. The defendants claimed a right to use the pathway, including through their purchase from one of the plaintiffs’ vendors.

The trial court dismissed the suit; the first appellate court reversed that decision and decreed the suit for the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed under Section 100 CPC.

1. Whether the vendors’ admitted grant of a right of access, which the appellants contended ran with the land, could be extinguished by transfer of the property.

2. Whether the plaintiffs could claim absolute rights over the “B” Schedule property despite the restrictive covenants in their sale deeds.

3. Whether the defendants were entitled to use the “B” Schedule property by way of an easement of necessity.

A purchaser who accepts a conveyance subject to express covenants cannot disregard those covenants when asserting exclusive rights, and a right of access granted to the vendors is not extinguished merely by transfer of the property.

The Court also considered the claim of easement of necessity. Although the appeal was under Section 100 CPC, the judgment cited no statutory provision beyond that procedural basis and no precedent.

The Court found that the sale deeds conveyed the “B” Schedule land subject to the vendors’ rights of access and other specified uses, and restricted the plaintiffs from erecting fences, walls, or other obstructions.

It held that the first appellate court had failed to give proper effect to those covenants and had wrongly limited the defendants’ rights to the portion associated with their vendor. The Court also relied on the evidence concerning access and the Commissioner’s report in addressing the necessity issue.

The judgment’s discussion on that point is internally inconsistent: it frames the question as whether the defendants had an easement of necessity, but states that the “Plaintiffs” were entitled to such an easement before concluding that the substantial questions were answered for the appellants.

The Court allowed the second appeal, set aside the first appellate court’s decree, and restored the trial court’s dismissal of the suit. There was no order as to costs.