Extraordinary writ jurisdiction cannot restore a long-cancelled licence after unexplained and inordinate delay.

The petitioner held a Public Distribution System (PDS) licence bearing No. 12 of 1994. Following allegations of irregularities, show-cause notices were issued and, after considering the petitioner’s replies, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Simri Bakhtiyarpur cancelled the licence on 21 February 2009. The petitioner’s statutory appeal was dismissed by the District Magistrate-cum-Collector, Saharsa on 1 February 2011.

The petitioner asserted that the criminal case arising from the same allegations culminated in acceptance of a final form and that consumer representations supporting him were not considered. He subsequently pursued proceedings before the High Court and, claiming liberty to avail the statutory remedy, filed Supply Revision Case No. 25 of 2023 before the Commissioner, Koshi Division. The revision was dismissed on the ground of limitation.

The petitioner challenged the cancellation, appellate, and revisional orders and sought restoration of his PDS licence. The State opposed the petition, contending that the challenge had become infructuous or was otherwise barred by the considerable delay of more than twelve years.

Whether the Commissioner was justified in dismissing the petitioner’s revision on the ground of delay, notwithstanding the petitioner’s assertion that he had been bona fide pursuing proceedings before the High Court.

Whether the High Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 to examine the merits of the cancellation of the PDS licence after an inordinate and unexplained delay of more than a decade.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to restoration of the PDS licence despite intervening changes in the regulatory framework governing PDS licences.

The Court applied Article 226 of the Constitution, under which writ jurisdiction is extraordinary and discretionary and is ordinarily withheld where the petitioner approaches the Court after inordinate and unexplained delay.

The Court applied the doctrine of delay and laches, holding that a person who allows an adverse administrative order to remain unchallenged for a substantial period cannot ordinarily seek discretionary relief as a matter of right.

It also applied the principle that statutory remedies must be pursued within a reasonable time and that subsequent regulatory or administrative developments may weigh against restoration of an old licence.

The cancellation order was passed on 21 February 2009 and affirmed in appeal on 1 February 2011, whereas the petitioner approached the revisional authority only in 2023. Although the petitioner relied on the pendency of C.W.J.C. No. 3759 of 2017 to explain the delay, the Court found that he had remained silent for a substantial period after dismissal of the appeal and had not pursued the statutory remedy within a reasonable time.

Applying delay and laches, the Court held that restoration of a licence cancelled more than a decade earlier could not ordinarily be ordered through discretionary writ jurisdiction. The Court also considered the State’s submission that the PDS regulatory framework had materially changed during the intervening period, creating possible administrative complications and intervening rights.

Although the petitioner’s allegations concerning non-consideration of his replies and the acceptance of the criminal final form were noted, the Court declined to examine the merits because of the enormous delay and subsequent developments.

It found no ground to interfere with the orders of the Sub-Divisional Officer, District Magistrate, or Commissioner. The writ petition was dismissed as devoid of merit, and any pending interlocutory applications were disposed of.