Factual GST classification disputes must be pursued through the statutory appellate remedy, not Article 226.

The petitioner supplied animal-feed products classified under heading 2309 and claimed exemption from GST under Entry 102 of the Exemption Notification. After an investigation concerning products manufactured by Harshvardhan Laboratory Pvt. Ltd. (HV Lab), the tax authorities issued the petitioner a show-cause notice proposing reclassification and GST liability.

The petitioner contended that the notice addressed different, Himalayan-branded products and that the adjudicating authority’s order travelled beyond the notice; it also alleged that its reply and request for cross-examination were not properly considered.

The Additional Commissioner confirmed a demand of ₹21,61,05,458 for FY 2019–20 to 2025–26. The petitioner challenged that order under Article 226, without first appealing under Section 107 of the CGST Act.

Whether the High Court should entertain the Article 226 petition despite the statutory appeal available under Section 107 of the CGST Act.

Whether the petitioner’s claims that the adjudication exceeded the show-cause notice and violated natural justice warranted writ-court interference without recourse to the statutory appeal.

Section 107 of the CGST Act provides an appeal against an adjudicating authority’s order, ordinarily within three months of communication, with a possible further one-month extension for sufficient cause; it also requires payment of admitted dues and a prescribed pre-deposit, after which recovery of the balance is deemed stayed.

Article 226 jurisdiction may be invoked notwithstanding an alternative remedy, but the Court declined to exercise it here because resolving the petitioner’s classification, notice-scope and natural-justice objections required consideration of factual and legal matters suited to the appellate authority.

The petitioner relied on *Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks* and *Godrej Sara Lee v. Excise and Taxation Officer*, among other authorities; the Court held the cited judgments distinguishable on the facts.

The Court found that the petition did not present a straightforward jurisdictional defect. The contention that the confirmed demand concerned products different from those identified in the show-cause notice required examination of the relevant facts, tariff headings, classification and notifications; the alleged denial of hearing and cross-examination likewise involved factual matters.

Those questions could be raised before and determined by the Section 107 appellate authority. The Court also noted the statutory pre-deposit requirement and concluded that the petitioner had not shown a basis for bypassing the appeal in this case.

It expressed no view on the merits and directed that the time spent prosecuting the writ petition be excluded when computing the limitation period for filing the appeal.