Failure to consider previous bail cancellation by Supreme Court and accused's contumacious conduct renders subsequent bail order perverse.

The Appellant/Informant challenged a High Court order dated 22.09.2025 granting regular bail to Respondent No. 2 (Jeeshan).

The case involved an incident on 12.05.2024 where the accused allegedly intercepted and assaulted the Appellant’s relatives to coerce the withdrawal of a separate murder case.

Jeeshan was allegedly seen in CCTV footage retrieving a pistol and firing multiple rounds.

Notably, the Supreme Court had previously cancelled Jeeshan’s first bail on 27.01.2025, noting the High Court's "grave error" in characterizing his role as "vague".

Following that cancellation, the Respondent evaded arrest for approximately 42 days, surrendering only after Section 82 CrPC proceedings were initiated.

Despite these facts, the High Court granted bail again on grounds of FIR delay, lack of firearm injuries, and parity with a co-accused.

1. Whether the High Court erred in granting bail without considering the previous bail cancellation order passed by the Supreme Court involving the same accused.

2. Whether the absence of firearm injuries and the principle of parity were sufficient grounds to grant bail despite evidence of firing and a history of witness intimidation.

3. Whether the contumacious conduct of the accused in evading surrender after a court order disentitled him to discretionary relief.

Section 307 of the IPC, emphasizing that the offence is established if an act is done with the intent or knowledge that it could cause death, regardless of whether a physical injury occurred.

The principle that a superior court may revoke bail if relevant materials or the gravity of the offence were ignored (Ajwar v. Waseem Anr. (2024)).

Factors for bail—specifically the character of the accused, likelihood of repetition, and apprehension of witness influence (Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee).

The doctrine that parity is not an inflexible rule when roles of accused persons are distinct (Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P.).

The Court found the High Court's order "manifestly erroneous" for failing to identify any supervening circumstances that justified a departure from the Supreme Court's earlier bail cancellation.

The Court reasoned that the High Court ignored critical evidence, including CCTV footage showing Jeeshan retrieving a weapon and eyewitness accounts of him firing.

Regarding Section 307 IPC, the Court clarified that the lack of firearm injuries did not negate the charge, as the intent to kill was prima facie evident from the act of firing.

The Court rejected the principle of parity, noting that Jeeshan’s role (firing) was distinct from the co-accused (stabbing) and that Jeeshan had additionally been charged under the Arms Act.

The Court viewed the Respondent’s 42-day evasion of the surrender order as contumacious conduct that weighed heavily against the grant of bail.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order dated 22.09.2025, cancelled the bail granted to Respondent No. 2, and directed him to surrender before the Trial Court forthwith.