Failure to prove 240 days’ continuous service defeats a daily-rated worker’s Section 25F retrenchment claim.

The petitioner was engaged by the NDMC as a Safai Karamchari on daily-wage basis on 1 December 1990. His services were allegedly terminated on 17 September 1991, following which he raised an industrial dispute.

The Labour Court was asked to determine whether the termination was illegal or unjustified and, if so, the relief to which the petitioner was entitled.

The Labour Court rejected the claim, holding that the petitioner had not completed 240 days of continuous service under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (“ID Act”), and that there was no evidence that juniors had been retained in service.

In the writ petition, the petitioner contended that Sundays and holidays ought to be counted and that the respondent had violated Sections 25G and 25H of the ID Act.

The muster roll produced by the petitioner recorded 238 days of work from 1 December 1990 to 5 September 1991, with no established service during April 1991 and no documentary proof of work until 17 September 1991.

Whether the petitioner had completed 240 days of continuous service so as to claim protection under Section 25F read with Section 25B of the ID Act, including by counting Sundays and holidays.

Whether the respondent violated Section 25G of the ID Act by retaining juniors while discontinuing the petitioner’s services.

Whether the petitioner could rely on an alleged violation of Section 25H of the ID Act when no issue concerning re-employment under that provision had been referred to or adjudicated by the Labour Court.

Whether the Labour Court’s award disclosed patent illegality, perversity, or an error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

The Court applied Sections 25B and 25F of the ID Act, holding that the workman bears the burden of establishing 240 days of continuous service and that the statutory protection against retrenchment is attracted only when the requisite service is proved.

It considered Sections 25G and 25H, observing that Section 25G requires proof that juniors were retained and that Section 25H concerns re-employment, which could not be adjudicated beyond the scope of the industrial reference.

The Court distinguished Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation v. Management of American Express International Banking Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 458, where paid holidays were counted in determining continuous service, because the present petitioner was a daily-rated worker paid only for days actually worked.

Under Articles 226 and 227, judicial review of a Labour Court award is limited and interference is justified only for patent illegality, perversity, or an error apparent on the face of the record; the writ court does not ordinarily re-appreciate evidence or substitute its view for a plausible factual finding.

The Court held that the petitioner’s own muster roll, exhibited as WW1/7, recorded only 238 days of work.

The entries showing work on nearly every day in several months demonstrated that Sundays and holidays had already been included in the recorded figures; therefore, their further addition could not bring the total to 240 days.

The petitioner also failed to prove that he worked during April 1991 or continued in service until 17 September 1991, and admitted that he had begun selling vegetables after 7 September 1991.

Accordingly, the Labour Court’s finding that 240 days of continuous service had not been established was a plausible factual conclusion and disclosed no ground for writ interference.

As to Section 25G, the petitioner made only a general assertion that juniors were retained, without identifying them or producing supporting material; hence, the Labour Court’s finding of no violation was not perverse.

Section 25H was held not to arise because the reference did not include any dispute regarding re-employment.

It further found no proven violation of Section 25G and declined to examine Section 25H because that issue fell outside the terms of reference.

Finding no patent illegality, perversity, or error apparent in the Labour Court’s award, the Court dismissed the writ petition and disposed of any pending applications.