Failure to prove the alleged bribe demand defeats conviction despite recovery of tainted money.

The appellant, a PA/Clerk in the Personnel Department of CCL, was accused of demanding a bribe from Reti Lal Khote in connection with Khote’s application for compassionate appointment.

Khote alleged that the appellant demanded ₹5,000–₹7,000 by telephone and agreed to accept ₹1,000 initially; following Khote’s complaint, the CBI laid a trap on 15 April 2004.

The prosecution alleged that the appellant accepted the tainted ₹1,000 and that chemical tests were positive.

The trial court convicted him under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and imposed concurrent sentences of imprisonment and fines.

The appellant appealed, denying demand and asserting that he lacked authority over the appointment process.

Whether the prosecution proved the essential foundational facts—particularly demand and acceptance of illegal gratification—necessary to sustain the appellant’s conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act

Whether the trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence contained a serious error warranting appellate interference

Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, require proof of the relevant demand and acceptance or obtainment of illegal gratification; mere recovery or receipt, without the necessary evidentiary foundation, is insufficient to establish the offences.

Under Section 20, once the foundational facts are proved in a prosecution under Section 7, the court must raise a rebuttable presumption that the gratification was received as a motive or reward; the presumption does not dispense with proof of those foundational facts.

Relying on *Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, (2023) 4 SCC 731, the Court stated that demand and acceptance may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, but the presumption of fact concerning them arises only after relevant foundational facts are established.

The Court found that the alleged telephone demand was not independently corroborated, and the complainant had no documentary proof of the call; the complaint also did not state that the appellant had demanded ₹1,000 specifically for processing or expediting the application.

The investigation did not verify the telephone conversation or the appellant’s role in processing the claim.

CCL evidence indicated that the appellant was not competent to appoint the complainant or process his claim, which was under scrutiny.

The Court also noted that the shadow witness, Habil Oraon, who was said to have heard the relevant conversation, was not examined.

In light of these deficiencies, it held that the prosecution had not established the foundational facts necessary to sustain the charges or invoke the statutory presumption; it concluded that the trial court had not properly assessed the material evidence.

As the appellant was on bail, he was discharged from his bail bond and his sureties were discharged.