Failure to submit a mandatory valid pre-qualification certificate by deadline justifies rejection; subsequent submission does not cure the defect.

Assam Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (AIDC) issued an EOI/Auction Notice dated 7 August 2025 for auctioning plant and machinery, demolishing and clearing structures, and disposing of fixed assets at Cachar Paper Mills, Assam.

The petitioner, a firm engaged in demolition and related work, submitted its bid before the deadline of 15 September 2025, along with an OHSAS/ISO certificate that had already expired.

AIDC rejected the petitioner’s technical bid by e-mail dated 25 September 2025 on the ground that the certificate had expired before the auction advertisement.

On 26 September 2025, the petitioner forwarded a valid ISO 45001:2018 certificate, issued on 24 May 2025 and valid until May 2028, contending that it had inadvertently uploaded the expired certificate and had possessed the valid certificate before the tender was published.

The petitioner approached the High Court under Article 226. The Court initially permitted it to participate in the auction but restrained declaration of the auction results without further leave.

AIDC opposed the petition, asserting that submission of a valid OHSAS certificate was a pre-bid qualification requirement and that accepting a fresh certificate after the bid deadline would amount to impermissible post-bid modification.

The Court noted that nine bidders, including the petitioner, had been disqualified for non-submission of the required OHSAS certificate.

1. Whether AIDC acted arbitrarily or perversely in rejecting the petitioner’s technical bid for failure to submit a valid OHSAS certificate before the bid-submission deadline.

2. Whether AIDC was required to consider the valid OHSAS certificate submitted by the petitioner after the technical bids had been evaluated and the rejection communicated.

3. Whether permitting the petitioner to cure the defect after the deadline would violate the principles of equality and a level playing field under Article 14 of the Constitution.

The Court applied Article 226 judicial-review principles governing tender and commercial-contract decisions.

Under G.J. Fernandez v. State of Karnataka, the tendering authority may strictly enforce tender conditions, while any deviation must apply uniformly and preserve a level playing field.

Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa establishes that courts should interfere in tender matters only where the decision is mala fide, arbitrary, irrational, biased, or contrary to public interest; judicial review examines the legality of the decision-making process, not the commercial merits of the decision.

Under Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., the words of a tender document must be given their intended meaning, and the tender author’s interpretation should not be displaced absent mala fides or perversity.

Central Coalfields Ltd. v. SLL-SML (Joint Venture Consortium) holds that the employer decides whether a tender condition is essential, and even an essential condition may be relaxed only if the relaxation applies equally to all bidders and potential bidders; courts cannot substitute their own view for that of the tendering authority.

The Court also relied on Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor for the principle that where power is prescribed to be exercised in a particular manner, it must ordinarily be exercised in that manner.

Article 14 prohibits selective relaxation of tender conditions, and the State’s interest in obtaining higher revenue cannot justify departure from the stipulated tender procedure.

The Court held that the requirement of submitting a valid OHSAS certificate was expressly incorporated into the pre-bid qualification criteria and was relevant to the safety-sensitive nature of the demolition and dismantling work.

Although the petitioner possessed a valid certificate before publication of the auction notice and promptly submitted it after rejection, it had not uploaded that certificate before the prescribed closing date.

The subsequent submission therefore amounted to a post-deadline correction of an essential pre-qualification document.

AIDC’s refusal to consider it was consistent with the auction conditions and was neither mala fide nor arbitrary.

The Court further reasoned that nine bidders had been rejected on the same ground; granting the petitioner an exception after technical evaluation could prejudice other rejected bidders and potential bidders and would undermine Article 14’s requirement of equal treatment.

The petitioner’s reliance on public interest, increased competition, and higher possible revenue could not justify selective deviation from the auction document, because maintaining the integrity and uniform application of the tender process was paramount.

It held that AIDC was entitled to enforce the requirement that a valid OHSAS certificate be submitted before the bid deadline and was not obliged to consider the certificate submitted after technical-bid evaluation.

The rejection of the petitioner’s technical bid was neither arbitrary nor discriminatory and did not warrant interference under Article 226.

The writ petition was dismissed, the interim order permitting participation in the auction was vacated, and no order as to costs was made.