False criminal prosecution resulting in acquittal constitutes mental cruelty and desertion under the Hindu Marriage Act.

In brief

The question

1. Whether the High Court, while hearing an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, has the power to admit additional evidence despite the non-express applicability of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC.

The court held

The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Family Court’s judgment.

It also directed

The Court held that the Appellant successfully proved both grounds: mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) and desertion under Section 13(1)(ib).

The marriage solemnized on 15-02-2015 was dissolved by a decree of divorce.

Liberty was reserved for the Respondent to claim permanent alimony under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act through a separate application.

01Facts

The Appellant (Husband) and Respondent (Wife) married on 15-02-2015.

¶ 2.1

The Appellant alleged that the Respondent lived with him for only 10–11 days before moving to her maternal home and subsequently filed a false FIR in 2018 under Section 498A IPC and Sections 4 & 5 of the Tonhi Pratadna Nivaran Adhiniyam, 2005 against him and four family members.

¶ 2.1, 2.2

The Family Court, Balodabazar, dismissed the husband’s divorce petition on 18-01-2023, finding no merit in the grounds of cruelty or desertion.

¶ 2.4

During the pendency of the First Appeal, the jurisdictional criminal court acquitted the Appellant and his family of all charges on 16-06-2025.

¶ 3

The Appellant moved an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC to bring this acquittal on record as additional evidence.

¶ 3

02Issues

i.1. Whether the High Court, while hearing an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, has the power to admit additional evidence despite the non-express applicability of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC.

¶ 12

ii.2. Whether the acquittal of the husband and his family in a criminal case initiated by the wife constitutes 'mental cruelty' under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

¶ 22

iii.3. Whether the Respondent's long-term separation and unsubstantiated allegations amount to 'desertion' under Section 13(1)(ib) of the Act of 1955.

¶ 22

03Law Applied

The Court applied Section 10 and 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 regarding procedure and appellate powers.

¶ 8, 9

It relied on the doctrine of ex debito justitiae and the principle that an express grant of statutory power carries ancillary powers to make the grant effective (*ITO v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi*).

¶ 15

For cruelty, it applied Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, guided by the illustrative benchmarks of mental cruelty in *Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh*.

¶ 26

It further applied the precedent from *Rani Narasimha Sastry v. Rani Suneela Rani*, which establishes that acquittal from Section 498A IPC charges after a trial constitutes cruelty.

¶ 30

For desertion, it applied Section 13(1)(ib) and the dual-requirement test (factum of separation and animus deserendi) established in *Adhyatma Bhattar Alwar v. Adhyatma Bhattar Sri Devi*.

¶ 35

Provisions in the judgment · 8 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Family Courts Act, 1984 Section 19 Section 10

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 Section 13 Section 10 Section 25

Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 34

Chhattisgarh tonahi Pratadna Nivaran Act, 2005 Section 5

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 41

04Reasoning

The Court first resolved the procedural hurdle, holding that while Order 41 CPC is not expressly mentioned in Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, the High Court possesses inherent ancillary powers to admit additional evidence to make its appellate jurisdiction meaningful.

¶ 18, 20

Applying this, the Court took judicial notice of the 2025 acquittal.

¶ 20

Regarding cruelty, the Bench reasoned that since the criminal court found the allegations of dowry and "Tonhi" (witchcraft) harassment substantiated by no cogent evidence, the Appellant and his family were forced to endure a seven-year-long "social scar" and the trauma of potential arrest.

¶ 32, 33

This meritless prosecution was held to be a "potent form of mental cruelty".

¶ 33

On desertion, the Court found that the Respondent had lived separately for seven years and refused cohabitation during counseling.

¶ 38

Since her primary justification for separation (cruelty/dowry) was debunked by the criminal acquittal, her withdrawal from the matrimonial home was deemed to be "without reasonable cause" and with the intent to end cohabitation permanently.

¶ 39