Financial hardship and unsubstantiated counsel negligence are insufficient grounds for condoning inordinate delay.

The appellant, a driver by profession, filed an appeal under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, challenging the award dated 01.09.2016 passed by the Second Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Morena

Accompanying the appeal was I.A. No. 3075 of 2018, filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking condonation of a 581-day delay

The appellant contended that the delay was due to his poor financial condition, which prevented him from depositing the mandatory 50% of the awarded amount, and the negligence of his counsel, who allegedly failed to inform him of the Tribunal’s decision

The respondent Insurance Company opposed the application, arguing the delay was inordinate and the grounds provided were unsubstantiated

Whether the appellant established "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the inordinate delay of 581 days in filing the appeal

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, regarding the condonation of delay upon showing "sufficient cause"

It relied on Balwant Singh (dead) v. Jagdish Singh and Others (2010) regarding the principle that litigants should not suffer for counsel's negligence

It further applied Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (2013), which held that a "liberal approach" cannot enable a party to take the law for granted or excuse a lack of bona fides

It cited Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd. (2012), establishing that in the absence of a plausible explanation, delay cannot be condoned mechanically

The Court observed that while the Motor Vehicles Act is beneficial social legislation warranting a liberal approach, the Law of Limitation cannot be rendered redundant

Upon perusal of the record, the Court found the appellant’s explanation for the 581-day delay to be "vague, general," and insufficient to cover the entire period

The Court rejected the plea of financial difficulty and the "bald allegation" of counsel negligence, noting a lack of supporting material to prove these claims

It emphasized that a litigant must remain vigilant and cannot shift the entire burden of diligence onto their counsel

The Court concluded that in the absence of bona fides or due diligence, the delay could not be condoned in a casual or mechanical manner

Consequently, I.A. No. 3075 of 2018 for condonation of delay was dismissed

As a result, the Miscellaneous Appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation