Fines imposed for distinct offences run concurrently when substantive sentences are ordered to run concurrently.

On December 22, 2014, police intercepted a vehicle during a checkpoint. The appellant, Hem Raj, was a passenger, and co-accused Kulwant Singh was the driver/owner.

A search revealed 4.100 kgs of charas (commercial quantity) hidden under the appellant’s seat.

The Special Judge, Chamba, convicted both under Sections 20(b)(ii)(C), 25, and 29 of the NDPS Act, sentencing them to 12 years rigorous imprisonment (RI) and a fine of ₹1,20,000 for Section 20, and a separate (but concurrent) 12 years RI and ₹1,20,000 fine for Sections 25 and 29.

The High Court reduced the substantive sentence to 10 years RI while maintaining the rest.

The appellant challenged the legality of separate sentences for the same transaction and the requirement to pay a "double" fine despite the concurrent nature of the sentences.

The Court applied Sections 20, 25, and 29 of the NDPS Act, 1985, noting that Sections 25 (allowing premises/conveyance for an offence) and 29 (abetment and conspiracy) are independent offences that adopt the punishment of the principal offence through "legislation by reference".

It further relied on Section 53 of the IPC, which defines both imprisonment and fine as "punishments".

The principle from Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat (2013), which distinguishes substantive sentences from default imprisonment.

The Court rejected the appellant's argument that Section 25 and 29 are merely extensions of Section 20. It reasoned that conspiracy and permitting the use of a conveyance are distinct, substantive offences.

By using the phrase "punishable with the punishment provided for that offence," the legislature employed the doctrine of incorporation, making the punishment for the main offence (Section 20) applicable to Sections 25 and 29.

While separate sentences are legal, the Court held that when such offences are "parasitic and derivative" or part of the same transaction, the "rule of wisdom" dictates they run concurrently to avoid double jeopardy.

Regarding the fine, the Court determined that since Section 53 IPC treats both RI and fines as "punishment," a direction for concurrent sentences must extend to the fine.

Imposing cumulative fines for the same set of facts, while making imprisonment concurrent, was deemed illogical and an impermissible double punishment.

Crucially, the Court held that a convict is not required to pay a double amount of fine when sentences are ordered to run concurrently.

As the appellant had already served 11 years (exceeding the 10-year substantive sentence and the default imprisonment period), the Court directed his immediate release.