FIR quashed under Section 482 where bald allegations lacked essential offence ingredients and were a counterblast.

The applicants invoked Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking quashing of FIR C.R. No. II-132 of 2015 registered at Visnagar City Police Station, Mahesana, for offences under Sections 323, 504, 506(1) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The FIR alleged that, on 11 September 2015 at about 6:00 p.m., the applicants questioned the de facto complainant about her minor daughter playing outside, abused and assaulted the complainant with fist and kick blows, and threatened to kill her before leaving the place when neighbours gathered.

The applicants contended that the FIR was a mala fide counterblast to an earlier FIR lodged by Applicant No. 1, in which Respondent No. 2 was arrayed as an accused, and that the allegations did not disclose the essential ingredients of the offences.

The complainant and the State opposed quashing, submitting that the incident occurred in the presence of witnesses and that the matter should proceed to trial.

Whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, disclosed the essential ingredients of offences under Sections 323, 504, 506(1) and 114 IPC against the applicants.

Whether the FIR was manifestly mala fide and instituted as a counterblast to the earlier FIR, thereby warranting exercise of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.

Whether continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of court and fail to serve the ends of justice.

The Court applied Section 482 CrPC, which empowers the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of court and secure the ends of justice.

It relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604, particularly the categories permitting quashing where the allegations do not constitute an offence, disclose no cognizable offence, are inherently improbable, or are manifestly mala fide and instituted to wreak vengeance.

Under Vikram Johar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2019) 14 SCC 207, Section 504 IPC requires intentional insult, provocation, and the intention or knowledge that such provocation would cause breach of peace; mere abuse is insufficient.

Sections 503 and 506 IPC require a threat of injury accompanied by an intention to cause alarm or to compel an act or omission, as explained in Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423.

Mohammad Wajid v. State of U.P., 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 624, further held that the specific abusive words and the intention to cause alarm or provoke breach of peace are material considerations.

The Court also applied the four-step test in Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIROnline 2025 SC 956, concerning the quality, conclusiveness, non-refutation and effect of defence material relied upon for quashing.

The Court found that the FIR contained only general allegations that the applicants abused and assaulted the complainant, without specifying the particular acts, individual roles, or injuries allegedly caused, thereby failing to make out a prima facie case under Section 323 IPC.

The allegation of abuse did not identify the words used or establish intentional insult of the nature required to provoke breach of peace under Section 504 IPC.

Similarly, the allegation that the applicants threatened to kill the complainant did not, on the material placed before the Court, demonstrate the requisite intention to cause alarm under Sections 503/506 IPC.

The Court also considered the prior FIR lodged by Applicant No. 1, in which Respondent No. 2 was an accused, and treated the impugned FIR as an apparent offshoot or counterblast.

Applying the Bhajan Lal categories and the Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani framework, the Court held that the applicants’ case was supported by material of unimpeachable quality, which remained unrefuted, and that continuation of the prosecution would be futile and oppressive.

FIR C.R. No. II-132 of 2015 registered at Visnagar City Police Station, Mahesana, under Sections 323, 504, 506(1) and 114 IPC, together with all consequential criminal proceedings, was quashed and set aside qua the applicants only.

The application was allowed, the rule was made absolute, and direct service was permitted.