Foreign nationals possess no enforceable right to enter India; visa issuance remains sovereign discretion.

The petitioner, an Italian national, had previously been granted a multiple-entry Indian e-Visa on 1 August 2024, permitting a continuous stay of up to 180 days without registration. His permitted period was due to expire on 27 January 2025.

Although he had booked a flight from Goa to Doha on 22 January 2025, the airline declined boarding after noticing a handwritten correction in his passport. He obtained a corrected passport from the Italian Consulate on 23 January 2025, but was subsequently informed that, having exceeded the 180-day period, he required an Exit Permit. The Exit Permit was issued on 5 February 2025, and he left India on 8 February 2025.

On returning to India on 10 February 2025, he was stopped at Mopa International Airport and allegedly informed that he had been blacklisted and would not be permitted to re-enter India. No written blacklisting order was furnished to him. His representations to the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Director (Foreigners) elicited no response.

He therefore filed a petition under Article 226 seeking a direction permitting him to enter India on a visa on arrival.

The Court applied Section 3 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, and Section 7 of the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, which empower the Central Government to prohibit, regulate or restrict the entry, departure, presence or continued presence of foreigners in India.

Relying on Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail , 1955 SCR (1) 1284, the Court held that the Government possesses an absolute and unfettered discretion, including the power to expel foreigners.

Under Louis De Raedt v. Union of India , 1991 (3) SCC 544, a foreigner’s protection under Article 21 is confined to life and personal liberty and does not include a right to reside or settle in India; the State’s power to expel a foreigner remains unrestricted.

The Court also relied on Randa Chehab v. Union of India & Ors. , 2023:DHC:9126, for the principle that entry into India is a matter of sovereign discretion and not an enforceable right.

A writ under Article 226 may issue only upon establishment of infringement of a legal or constitutional right.

The Court held that the petitioner could not claim mandamus because entry into India and issuance of a visa are matters involving national security, foreign policy and executive discretion, rather than vested rights enforceable against the State.

The petitioner’s alleged blacklisting and refusal of re-entry therefore did not, by themselves, establish infringement of a legally enforceable right.

The Court distinguished Mohd. Javed , where the foreign national was married to an Indian citizen, had two Indian-citizen children, and had resided in India for thirteen years on a valid Long-Term Visa that was revoked without procedure.

In that exceptional factual context, natural justice was required before deprivation of the family’s Article 21 interests.

The present petitioner had no comparable family or continuing-residence circumstances, and the decision did not create a right of entry or require the grant of a visa.

The writ petition was dismissed.

The application for preponement was disposed of, and the previously fixed hearing date of 16 November 2026 was cancelled.