Fraudulent date-of-birth certificate securing public employment renders appointment void ab initio and warrants dismissal.

The applicant was appointed as Helper Grade II in the Integral Coach Factory under the Meritorious Sports Persons quota on 4 September 2004. At appointment, he produced a Transfer Certificate showing his date of birth as 12 April 1981.

Following a vigilance complaint, the certificate was verified and declared non-genuine by the issuing school. The respondents further found that the applicant had actually studied up to Class XII at another school, whose records showed his date of birth as 12 April 1975.

A major-penalty charge memorandum was issued on 4 January 2019 alleging that the applicant had submitted a forged certificate and falsely declared his date of birth to secure appointment.

The Inquiry Officer concluded that the charge was “not proved,” principally because the applicant’s personal file and certain documentary evidence were unavailable and the person who received the certificate at the time of appointment had not been examined.

The Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the Inquiry Officer’s report after issuing a dissent note and obtaining the applicant’s representation. It held the charge proved and imposed dismissal from service by order dated 29 November 2019.

The applicant’s appeal and revision petition were rejected on 30 September 2020 and 14 August 2021, respectively. He challenged all three orders before the Tribunal.

1. Whether the Disciplinary Authority was justified in disagreeing with the Inquiry Officer’s finding that the charge of submitting a false Transfer Certificate was not proved.

2. Whether the departmental proceedings established that the applicant had falsely declared his date of birth and submitted a non-genuine certificate to obtain appointment under the Sports quota.

3. Whether dismissal from service was legally sustainable in view of the applicant’s fraudulent procurement of appointment and the passage of more than thirteen years before disciplinary action was initiated.

The Tribunal applied the Railway Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968, under which the Disciplinary Authority may disagree with the Inquiry Officer’s findings after communicating its reasons and allowing the charged employee an opportunity to respond.

It relied on Railway Board’s letter dated 19 June 2000, RBE No. 120/2000, prescribing an age limit of 18–25 years for appointment under the Sports quota.

The Tribunal applied the principle that judicial review of disciplinary action is confined primarily to the decision-making process and does not permit substitution of the court’s view for that of the disciplinary authority unless the decision is procedurally improper, irrational, or shocking to the conscience, as stated in Ram Saran v. Inspector General of Police, CRPF, (2006) 2 SCC 541, relying on Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation and V. Ramana v. A.P. State Road Transport Corporation.

It further relied on R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala, (2004) 2 SCC 105, and Union of India v. M. Bhaskaran, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 100, for the rule that employment obtained through fraud or false certificates is void or voidable at the employer’s option, and that long service does not create an equitable right to retain such employment or claim consequential benefits.

The Tribunal held that the Inquiry Officer had given the applicant the benefit of doubt because of evidentiary gaps, but that this did not prevent the Disciplinary Authority from independently evaluating the record and disagreeing with the report in accordance with the applicable disciplinary rules.

The certificate-producing school had expressly certified that the Transfer Certificate showing the applicant’s date of birth as 12 April 1981 was not genuine, while the records of the school actually attended by him showed his date of birth as 12 April 1975.

The applicant’s service-book entry, bearing his signature, also recorded the false date of birth.

Since the applicant would have been approximately 29 years old on the date of appointment and therefore beyond the prescribed Sports quota age limit of 25 years, the false certificate was material to his eligibility and enabled him to secure an appointment for which he was otherwise ineligible.

Applying the limited scope of judicial review and the precedents concerning fraudulent appointments, the Tribunal found no procedural or legal error in the disciplinary, appellate, or revisional orders and held that the seriousness of the misconduct justified dismissal.

In light of the resulting ineligibility for Sports quota appointment and the fraudulent basis of employment, dismissal from service was held sustainable.

The OA was dismissed as devoid of merit, with no order as to costs.