General marital quarrels and unsubstantiated allegations do not establish cruelty warranting divorce.

The appellant-husband challenged the judgment dated 09 February 2023 of the Principal Judge, Family Court, Cachar, Silchar, in F.C. (Civil) Case No. 191/2017, whereby his petition for divorce under Sections 13(1)(i-a) and 13(1)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (“HMA”) on the grounds of cruelty and desertion was dismissed.

The parties married on 13 December 2008 and had one son.

The husband alleged that the wife frequently quarrelled with and insulted him and his mother, failed to adjust in the matrimonial home, stayed at her parental house for extended periods, physically tortured him, and damaged his photography equipment.

The parties admittedly began living separately on 24 January 2016, while the divorce petition was filed in July 2017.

The wife denied the allegations, stated that she was willing to live with the husband, and asserted that the husband had left her and their son without providing maintenance.

Mediation failed, and during interaction with the High Court the husband stated that he was unwilling to live with the wife, whereas the wife remained willing to resume matrimonial life.

1. Whether the respondent-wife had deserted the appellant-husband for a continuous period of at least two years immediately preceding the filing of the divorce petition under Section 13(1)(i-b) of the HMA?

2. Whether the conduct attributed to the respondent-wife constituted physical or mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the HMA, warranting dissolution of the marriage?

Section 13(1)(i-a) of the HMA permits divorce on the ground of cruelty, while Section 13(1)(i-b) requires proof that the respondent deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding presentation of the divorce petition.

Cruelty may be physical or mental and must involve conduct causing a reasonable apprehension that it is harmful or injurious to continue the matrimonial relationship: Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988) 1 SCC 105; V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, (1994) 1 SCC 537.

Mental cruelty is assessed cumulatively from the nature, duration and effect of the conduct, and not by considering isolated incidents: Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta, (2002) 5 SCC 706.

The conduct must be grave and weighty and exceed ordinary wear and tear of married life: A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, (2005) 2 SCC 22.

Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511, identifies relevant instances of mental cruelty, including sustained abusive or humiliating conduct, conduct affecting mental health, and prolonged separation, while clarifying that ordinary quarrels, trivial irritations, coldness or lack of affection ordinarily do not constitute cruelty.

Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey, (2002) 2 SCC 73, similarly distinguishes actionable cruelty from ordinary wear and tear and requires conduct that causes serious mental suffering or reasonable apprehension of harm.

The desertion ground failed because the parties separated on 24 January 2016 but the petition was filed only in July 2017; the statutory period of two years had therefore not elapsed.

On cruelty, the husband’s allegations were general and lacked specific particulars of abusive incidents, physical violence, or conduct creating apprehension for his life, limb or health.

The evidence did not establish a sustained and grave course of conduct meeting the threshold of mental cruelty under Samar Ghosh, Parveen Mehta and A. Jayachandra.

The alleged quarrels, lack of adjustment, insults and neglect were treated as insufficient, without more, to constitute cruelty.

The allegation that the wife could not adjust with the husband’s mother was found unreliable because the mother’s evidence indicated that she lived separately and that no quarrel had occurred between them; this materially undermined the husband’s credibility.

Although the husband alleged that the wife damaged his photography equipment and that his mother had been assaulted once, these allegations did not establish the required physical or mental cruelty on the evidence as a whole.

Conversely, the evidence showed that the husband had left the wife and their son, while the wife continued to express willingness to resume cohabitation.

Desertion was not established because the separation had lasted only approximately one and a half years when the divorce petition was filed.

Cruelty was also not proved, as the allegations were largely vague, unsupported by reliable evidence, and did not demonstrate grave, sustained conduct beyond ordinary matrimonial discord.

The Court found no reason to interfere with the Family Court’s judgment and dismissed the matrimonial appeal, directing that the trial court record be sent back.