### Habitual Criminal Activity Lacking Impact on Public Order Cannot Justify Preventive Detention under PASA Act

The petitioner, Ankush Dinesh Shukla, was preventively detained by an order dated 05.02.2026 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Surat City

He was classified as a "dangerous person" under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act (PASA), 1985

The grounds for detention were based on two criminal cases registered against him under Section 303(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) at Pandesara Police Station between 19.01.2026 and 25.01.2026

The petitioner had already been granted bail by the concerned court in both instances

The petitioner challenged the legality of the detention through a friend

Whether the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority in exercise of powers under the PASA Act, 1985, is sustainable in law given the material on record

Whether the activities of the detenue, based on the registered criminal cases, can be classified as prejudicial to the "maintenance of public order"

The court primarily applied Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "dangerous person" as one who habitually commits or attempts to commit specified offenses under the IPC/BNS or Arms Act within a three-year period

It relied on the constitutional principle under Article 21 that preventive detention is an exception to be used sparingly in rare cases, as established in *Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu*

Furthermore, it applied the doctrine from *Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala* (AIR 2025 SC 2868) and *Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana*, which mandates that extraordinary preventive detention statutes should not be used to circumvent ordinary criminal law when remedies like cancellation of bail are available

The court examined whether the two registered cases provided sufficient material to establish a disturbance of "public order" as opposed to mere "law and order" issues.

The court observed that the Detaining Authority failed to demonstrate how the petitioner’s actions disturbed public health, tranquility, or order at large

Relying on Apex Court precedents, the court noted that the petitioner had already been granted bail in the underlying offenses

It reasoned that if the authorities feared the petitioner would re-offend, the appropriate legal remedy was to move for the cancellation of bail under ordinary criminal law rather than resorting to the "hard law" of preventive detention

The court concluded that the authority’s subjective satisfaction was mechanically arrived at and lacked a nexus between the alleged activities and the maintenance of public order

The court allowed the petition and quashed the detention order dated 05.02.2026

It directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case, and made the Rule absolute