HEADLINE: Common object in unlawful assembly established by collective arrival, coordinated slogans, and joint flight from crime scene.

On February 8, 1983, at approximately 6:30 p.m., the deceased, Akhand Pratap Singh (a Sub-Inspector on leave), was sitting with his family in a courtyard.

Seven accused persons entered; three (including appellant Kailash Mishra) were armed with guns, while the remaining four (including appellants Pandey and the Tiwaris) carried farsas and torches.

The armed assailants fired at Singh, causing fatal injuries; he died en route to the hospital.

The motive was attributed to political rivalry and the deceased’s assistance in a previous criminal case against the accused.

The Trial Court convicted all seven under Sections 148 and 302 r/w 149 of the IPC.

Appellants 1 and 3 died during the pendency of the appeal.

The remaining appellants challenged the conviction on grounds of an ante-timed FIR, unreliable dying declaration, and lack of common object.

Whether the FIR was ante-timed and the testimony of the eye-witnesses (P.W. 1 to 4) was reliable despite being "interested" witnesses.

Whether the oral dying declaration recorded by the Investigating Officer was medically plausible given the nature of the injuries to the deceased's tongue and mouth.

Whether the appellants who did not fire shots (Appellants 4-7) shared a common object to murder under Section 149.

Section 302 of the IPC (Punishment for Murder) and Section 149 of the IPC (Common Object of Unlawful Assembly).

Principle from Rana Pratap v. State of Haryana regarding the diverse natural reactions of eye-witnesses.

Principle from Darbara Singh v. State of Punjab, which establishes that ocular testimony prevails over medical evidence unless they are totally irreconcilable.

K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, requiring a "fit state of mind" for admissibility of a dying declaration.

State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao regarding the necessity of a shared purpose for Section 149 liability.

The Court dismissed the "ante-timed FIR" argument, holding that minor mathematical discrepancies in the timeline of recording statements do not outweigh the fact that the deceased was alive when the FIR was initially lodged under Section 307.

The Court found the dying declaration unreliable because the medical evidence showed the deceased's tongue and jaw were badly lacerated, and the doctor (P.W. 6) explicitly noted he was not in a fit condition to speak.

The Court held that the case was independently proven by four consistent eye-witnesses.

The Court rejected the defense that identifying the accused was impossible in the dark, noting the parties were co-villagers and there was light from a bonfire and torches.

The Court affirmed the liability of the non-firing appellants under Section 149, reasoning that their arrival in a group with weapons, shouting "maaro-maaro," and fleeing together proved a common object to kill.

The Court answered that the non-firing appellants were legally liable as members of an unlawful assembly sharing a common object.

The Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the life imprisonment sentences.

Appellants 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 were ordered to surrender within six weeks to serve the remainder of their sentences.