High burn percentage alone does not invalidate a voluntary and reliable dying declaration.

The Appellant married Gitanjali Palo on 17.01.1999.

It was alleged that the Appellant demanded Rs. 2,00,000/- as dowry, of which Rs. 50,000/- was paid.

On 23.03.1999, following a dispute at their residence, the Appellant allegedly poured kerosene on his wife and set her ablaze.

The victim was rushed to MKCG Medical College and Hospital with 90-95% burn injuries.

Before her death on 26.03.1999, she made an oral dying declaration to her mother (P.W.2) and a written dying declaration recorded by a treating doctor (P.W.8).

The Trial Court convicted the Appellant under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

The Appellant challenged the conviction, primarily contesting the reliability of the dying declarations given the extent of the burn injuries.

1. Whether the dying declaration recorded by the doctor (P.W.8) could be considered reliable and voluntary in the absence of a specific medical fitness certificate and given the 90-95% burn injuries.

2. Whether the prosecution sufficiently proved the presence of the Appellant at the scene of the crime to sustain a conviction under Section 302 IPC.

The Court applied Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) regarding punishment for murder.

It relied on the evidentiary value of dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act.

The Court followed the precedent in *P.V. Radhakrishna v. State of Karnataka*, establishing that the percentage of burns is not a determinative factor for the credibility of a dying declaration.

It further applied *Purshottam Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, holding that a victim with 100% burns can still be capable of making a statement.

The court applied *State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dal Singh*, which clarified that a formal medical certificate of fitness is not an absolute essential if the recorder is satisfied of the declarant's state of mind.

Finally, it applied *Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay*, affirming that a reliable dying declaration can form the sole basis of conviction without corroboration.

The Court rejected the Appellant’s contention that 90% burn injuries rendered the deceased incapable of giving a statement, noting that P.W.8 (the doctor) was an independent witness who testified that the patient was conscious and well-oriented at the time of recording.

The Court found the dying declaration (Ext.7/3) to be clear, consistent, and recorded in a proper question-answer format.

Although P.W.8 did not prepend a formal certificate to the declaration, his contemporaneous entry in the bed-head ticket regarding the patient’s consciousness satisfied the legal requirement for mental fitness.

Regarding the Appellant's presence, the Court noted his own admission under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that he had gone to fetch his wife from her mother’s house that evening and that she was inside their house when the incident occurred.

The consistency between the oral declaration to the mother and the written declaration to the doctor reinforced the truthfulness of the accusation.

The Court upheld the conviction under Section 302 IPC, finding no reason to interfere with the Trial Court's judgment.

The appeal was dismissed, the Appellant's bail bonds were cancelled, and he was ordered to be taken into custody to serve the remainder of his life sentence.