High Court cannot entertain writ petition when efficacious alternative remedy exists under Armed Forces Tribunal Act.

The petitioner, a Colonel in the Indian Army, challenged a Court of Inquiry and subsequent disciplinary actions, including an attachment order and a tentative charge sheet dated December 30, 2025.

He alleged that these actions violated Army Rule 180 and the principles of natural justice due to the non-supply of essential documents.

The respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, arguing that the petitioner had an efficacious alternative remedy before the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT).

1. Whether the writ petition is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when an alternative remedy exists under the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007.

2. Whether the ongoing functioning of the Regional Bench of the AFT at Jabalpur renders the statutory remedy "efficacious" despite the petitioner's claims of geographical inconvenience.

Section 3(o) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, which defines "service matters" broadly to include conditions of service and disciplinary actions.

Section 14 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, which grants the Tribunal jurisdiction over all service matters.

The precedent in Union of India v. Lieutenant Colonel Dharamvir Singh (2019), which held that High Courts should not pre-empt disciplinary jurisdiction in the Army.

The doctrine from Union of India v. Parashotam Dass (2025) emphasizing that while Article 226 is part of the basic structure, High Courts should exercise self-restraint when a specialized tribunal exists.

The principle regarding exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy as per Leelavathi N. v. State of Karnataka (2025).

The court reasoned that since the Regional Bench of the AFT at Jabalpur is active and functioning, it constitutes an "efficacious" forum for the petitioner’s grievances.

The judge observed that the prayers sought—quashing a Court of Inquiry and an attachment order—fall squarely within the definition of "service matters" under Section 3(o) of the AFT Act.

By applying the principle of judicial self-restraint established in Dharamvir Singh and Parashotam Dass, the court determined that it should not interfere in military disciplinary processes at the preliminary stage through writ jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the petitioner’s argument regarding the inconvenience of the tribunal’s location, noting that the existence of a statutory mechanism outweighs such personal difficulties in the interest of maintaining Army discipline.

The petition was disposed of with a direction allowing the petitioner ten days to approach the AFT, with the extension of interim relief for those ten days only.