High Court may suo motu exercise inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS to quash vexatious criminal complaints.

The appellant, a 35-year-old school instructor, filed an application under Section 173(4) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) before the Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Lakhimpur Kheri.

She alleged that the opposite parties cheated her husband in a land transaction and that, following a dispute over unpaid money, opposite party No. 2 sexually exploited her under the pretext of helping her recover said funds.

A police report indicated that the land dispute had already been settled via an amicable resolution in a previous case (Case Crime No. 381/2025), where the money was refunded.

On April 17, 2026, the trial court passed an order treating the appellant's application as a complaint rather than directing the registration of an FIR.

The appellant challenged this order, seeking an FIR registration.

1. Whether the allegations in the application, taken at face value, disclose any cognizable offence or are inherently improbable.

2. Whether the High Court, while exercising its appellate jurisdiction, can suo motu invoke its inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of the process of law.

The court applied the inherent powers preserved under Section 528 of the BNSS (corresponding to Section 482 Cr.P.C.), which allows the High Court to make orders necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of any court.

It relied on the State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal guidelines, specifically Category 1 (allegations not constituting an offence) and Category 5 (allegations being absurd or inherently improbable).

The court further cited Popular Muthiah v. State, establishing that inherent jurisdiction can be exercised suo motu during appellate or revisional proceedings.

Article 215 of the Constitution of India, which designates the High Court as a "Court of Record" with plenary powers to determine its own jurisdiction.

The court referenced Ishwar Chand Sharma v. State of U.P. regarding the duty of courts to curb vexatious litigation.

The Court observed that the appellant’s version was "extremely unnatural" and "strange," noting that a 35-year-old married woman claiming to permit sexual exploitation solely to recover her husband's money—without allegations of force or deceit—would not be believed by any person of ordinary prudence.

The Court found the timing of the complaint suspicious, as it appeared to be a tool to blackmail the opposite parties for undisclosed dues after the husband’s land dispute was already resolved.

Since the complainant’s husband (the person with the actual legal interest) had not initiated any proceedings and no specific offence under the SC/ST Act was made out despite her caste status, the Court reasoned that allowing the complaint to proceed would result in "unwarranted persecution" and a "wastage of precious judicial time".

The Court concluded that even though the appellant sought an FIR, the underlying complaint itself was a manifest abuse of law.

The Court answered the issues by stating that the allegations did not constitute a prima facie offence and were "phantom claims".

Consequently, the High Court set aside the trial court's order dated April 17, 2026, and quashed the entire proceedings arising from the application under Section 173(4) BNSS against the opposite parties.