High Courts cannot reappreciate administrative findings or compare dealership candidates under Article 226 absent patent arbitrariness.

The petitioner, Anita Verma, applied for allotment of a Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (“HPCL”) retail dealership at Location No. 58, Nasurullahganj–Ladkui, District Sehore, pursuant to an advertisement issued by HPCL. Respondent No. 3, Vinita Parihar, was also an applicant, and HPCL issued a Letter of Intent in her favour after evaluating the competing applications.

The petitioner challenged the marks awarded to respondent No. 3, particularly in respect of her capacity to arrange finances through fixed and movable assets, and objected to the title and lease documents submitted for the proposed site. Her representation and written submissions before the Dealership Selection Complaint Redressal Forum were rejected.

The Chief Regional Manager thereafter communicated rejection of her complaint by order dated 23 August 2012, which was challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution.

During the pendency of the petition, HPCL approved reconstitution of the dealership pursuant to respondent No. 3’s request and executed a fresh dealership agreement dated 22 March 2024 in favour of respondent No. 4, Ishan Ali, proprietor of M/s Vindyavasini Filling Station.

Whether HPCL’s rejection of the petitioner’s complaint and its allocation of marks and dealership to respondent No. 3 were arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide, or contrary to the norms contained in the dealership advertisement?

Whether the lease and title documents submitted by respondent No. 3 were legally invalid under Section 168 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959?

Whether the High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, could reappreciate the evidence, recalculate the candidates’ marks, and substitute its assessment for that of the Complaint Redressal Forum?

Whether the petitioner had locus to challenge the subsequent reconstitution of the dealership in favour of respondent No. 4?

The Court applied the principles governing judicial review of governmental contracts and dealership selections under Article 226.

Relying on Tata Cellular v. Union of India, as quoted in Directorate of Education v. Educomp Datamatics Ltd., (2004) 4 SCC 19, and Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 617, the Court held that judicial review examines the decision-making process, not the commercial merits of the decision; interference is justified only for arbitrariness, mala fides, bias, discrimination, or Wednesbury unreasonableness.

The Court also relied on Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation, (2000) 5 SCC 287, for the principle that the authority inviting applications is the best judge of the applicable terms and conditions.

Under Sanjay Kumar Jha v. Prakash Chandra Chaudhary, (2019) 2 SCC 499, the High Court ordinarily cannot adjudicate disputed questions of fact, reappreciate evidence, or undertake a comparative assessment of candidates in writ jurisdiction; even where an apparent error exists, the usual course is remand to the competent authority.

Section 168 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 was considered in relation to restrictions on leases of agricultural land; the Court held that the statutory bar did not apply because the relevant land had been diverted for non-agricultural use.

The Court found that the Complaint Redressal Forum had considered each objection raised by the petitioner and recorded detailed findings on the allocation of marks and the validity of respondent No. 3’s documents.

The diversion order showed that the land covered by the lease had been converted for non-agricultural use; consequently, the objection based on Section 168 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code was rejected.

Applying the limited scope of judicial review, the Court held that it could not act as an appellate authority, reassess the evidence, or substitute its own evaluation of the candidates’ comparative merit.

The petitioner failed to establish any arbitrariness, discrimination, mala fides, bias, or patent violation of the dealership norms in HPCL’s decision-making process.

Since the petitioner failed to establish any right to the dealership against respondent No. 3, she also lacked locus to challenge the subsequent reconstitution agreement in favour of respondent No. 4.

The Court further held that the petitioner could not challenge the subsequent reconstitution of the dealership in favour of respondent No. 4 because she had not established any entitlement to the dealership in the first place.

The writ petition was consequently dismissed as meritless, and no relief was granted to the petitioner.