High Courts cannot reappreciate facts under Article 226 absent perversity or jurisdictional error.

Respondent No. 2, Ms. Surbhi Dutt, became a member of Mount Everest Co-operative Group Housing Society and deposited approximately ₹8,60,110 towards membership and the proposed allotment of a flat.

After the Society was blacklisted by the DDA, she sought withdrawal from the Society and refund of the deposited amount with interest by letter dated 9 September 2000.

The Society accepted the withdrawal request and agreed to refund the amount with interest at 7%, subject to replacement of the membership.

A part-payment of ₹3,60,000 was made, leaving a balance claimed to be unpaid.

The member thereafter made repeated demands and correspondence continued with the Society up to 2006.

The member had also instituted W.P.(C) 6540/2007, which was decided on 3 August 2010; since she had sought withdrawal and received part-refund, no flat was allotted to her.

She subsequently initiated proceedings under Sections 70 and 71 of the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 2003.

The arbitrator awarded the principal amount, interest at 7% per annum, arbitration fee and costs in her favour on 3 April 2023.

The Delhi Co-operative Tribunal dismissed the Society’s appeal on 2 April 2026, holding, inter alia, that the claim was not barred by limitation.

The Society challenged both orders under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Whether the member’s claim for refund under Sections 70 and 71 of the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 2003 was barred by limitation?

Whether the High Court should interfere under Article 226 with the concurrent findings of the arbitrator and the Delhi Co-operative Tribunal?

The Court applied Sections 70 and 71 of the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 2003 concerning adjudication of disputes through arbitration.

It considered the limitation objection under Section 70 and distinguished Suresh Chand Jain, where a refund claim was raised for the first time after approximately ten years, holding that the present case involved an immediate refund demand, part-acknowledgment of liability and continuing correspondence.

On the scope of judicial review, the Court held that Article 226 does not permit reappreciation of evidence or substitution of factual findings unless the subordinate authority acted without jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction, committed a patent illegality or reached a perverse conclusion.

This principle was drawn from Jagdish Singh Chauhan v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, relying on Ajay Singh v. Kacheru, Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee and Krishnanand v. Director of Consolidation.

The Court held that the limitation objection failed because the member had sought refund at the earliest stage, in September 2000, rather than raising the claim for the first time after an unexplained delay.

The Society’s communication agreeing to refund the amount with 7% interest, its part-payment, and the subsequent correspondence constituted material supporting acknowledgment of the refund liability.

The member’s continued engagement with the Society and involvement in related litigation also demonstrated that she had not abandoned or acquiesced in the non-payment of the balance amount.

The Court further found that the arbitrator and the Tribunal had considered the documentary record and had reached concurrent factual findings regarding the deposit, part-refund and outstanding liability.

Since those findings were neither perverse nor jurisdictionally infirm, the limited scope of Article 226 review did not permit the High Court to reassess the evidence or interfere with the orders below.

It held that the member’s refund claim was not barred by limitation and that no ground existed for interference under Article 226 with the arbitral award or the Tribunal’s decision.

The writ petition was accordingly dismissed, and all pending applications were disposed of.