High percentage of burn injuries does not invalidate a voluntary, conscious, and medically certified dying declaration.

The Appellant was accused of luring a 17-year-old girl into a friendship via mobile communication, subsequently taking her to a secluded spot near Sivakasi where he committed penetrative sexual assault under the pretext of marriage

He clandestinely recorded the act and later sent the footage to the victim, using it to blackmail and intimidate her

Distressed by the harassment and threats to circulate the video, the victim committed self-immolation and later succumbed to her injuries in the hospital

Before her death, her statement was recorded by both the Sub-Inspector of Police and a Judicial Magistrate

The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 363 IPC and Sections 5 and 6 of the POCSO Act, sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life

The Appellant challenged the conviction primarily by questioning the reliability of the dying declaration due to the victim's 100% burn injuries

1. Whether the prosecution proved the charges beyond reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the reliability of a dying declaration made by a victim with extensive burn injuries?

2. Whether the sentence of life imprisonment for the remainder of the natural life is justified under the law?

The Court applied Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, which makes a statement regarding the cause of death admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule based on the maxim nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire

It relied on the Constitution Bench decision in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, which held that a medical certificate of fitness is a rule of caution, not an absolute necessity, if the person recording the statement is satisfied with the declarant's mental state

Regarding electronic evidence, the Court applied the principle from Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, stating that a Section 65B(4) certificate is unnecessary if the original electronic device is produced as primary evidence

The Court also applied the statutory presumptions under the POCSO Act, shifting the burden of proof to the accused once the foundational facts are established

The Court rejected the argument that 100% burn injuries automatically render a dying declaration unreliable, noting that the "decisive test" is the victim's mental fitness and consciousness, not the severity of physical injury

The Court examined the testimony of the Judicial Magistrate (P.W.11) and the attending doctor (P.W.6), both of whom confirmed the victim was conscious and oriented during the recording

The Court found the two dying declarations (Ex.P19 and Ex.P1) were consistent, voluntary, and free from tutoring

Furthermore, the Court found that the Trial Court erred in discarding electronic evidence for lack of a Section 65B certificate; since the original mobile phone (M.O.6) was seized and the forensic report (Ex.P34) confirmed the presence of the offending video, it served as powerful corroboration of the victim's narrative

The appellant failed to provide any evidence to rebuttal the statutory presumptions under POCSO

The High Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the conviction and sentence passed by the Special Court

The Court found the sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life proportionate given the "grave nature" of the crime, involving sexual assault of a minor, digital exploitation, and abetment of suicide

The conviction under Section 363 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act was upheld