Honda logo stickers can sustain copyright prosecution despite registration certificate being omitted from charge-sheet, Gujarat HC rules

An FIR was registered against the applicant under Sections 51, 63 and 64 of the Copyright Act, 1957, after police seized Honda-branded two-wheeler accessories and 250 standalone logo stickers from commercial premises, including the applicant’s unit.

The applicant sought quashing of the FIR, charge-sheet and consequential proceedings, arguing, among other things, that the dispute concerned trade marks, that the Copyright Registration Certificate and authorisation documents were absent from the charge-sheet, and that copyright protection was barred by Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act. The complainant and State opposed quashing, relying on copyright registrations for the Honda Wing Logo and packaging artwork, the seized stickers, and the applicant’s alleged lack of authorisation.

Whether the omission of the Copyright Registration Certificate and authorisation letter from the charge-sheet was fatal to the prosecution or could be addressed during trial.

Whether Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act barred copyright protection for the relevant artistic works.

Whether copyright in the logo could support proceedings independently of trade mark rights, and whether the search and seizure were valid despite Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act.

Whether the allegations and material disclosed a prima facie case warranting refusal to quash under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Section 482 Cr.P.C. permits quashing where, taking the allegations at face value, no offence is disclosed; the High Court should not conduct a mini-trial or determine disputed factual defences (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal).

Sections 242(2), 294 and 311 Cr.P.C. permit documents to be produced or received during trial, and an investigative omission to file a relevant document is not necessarily fatal; the Court relied on CBI v. R.S. Pai for the principle that additional documents may be produced with the court’s permission.

Sections 13, 14(c), 45 and 48 of the Copyright Act govern copyright in original artistic works, reproduction rights, registration and the evidentiary status of the Register; Section 15(2) applies to qualifying designs reproduced industrially beyond the statutory threshold, while Section 2(d) of the Designs Act excludes trade marks and artistic works as defined under the Copyright Act.

Section 64 of the Copyright Act authorises seizure by a police officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector; the court held that the Trade Marks Act’s Section 115(4) requirements apply to proceedings under that Act and do not restrict a Copyright Act seizure.

The court also relied on Vishwa Mitter v. O.P. Poddar for the principle that any person may set the criminal law in motion.

The court treated the alleged recovery of 250 standalone Honda logo stickers, together with logo-bearing accessories, as sufficient at the quashing stage to disclose a prima facie allegation of unauthorised reproduction of registered artistic work.

It held that the absence of the registration certificate and authorisation letter from the charge-sheet did not, by itself, defeat the prosecution because those documents could be produced during trial.

It further considered the certificate’s endorsement that the work was not registered under the Designs Act, alongside the statutory exclusion of artistic works from the definition of “design,” and rejected the applicant’s Section 15(2) argument at this stage.

The court found the Copyright Act’s remedies and seizure power independent of the safeguards applicable to Trade Marks Act offences, and left disputed matters—including the stickers’ authenticity, purchase documentation and mens rea—to the trial court.

It dismissed the application, discharged the Rule and directed the trial court to proceed without being influenced by the judgment’s factual observations.

Although the operative order initially stated that any interim relief stood vacated, the Court’s further order continued the interim relief for six weeks to enable the applicant to approach the Supreme Court.