IBC appeals to Supreme Court face a strict 60-day limit; tax department’s late appeal dismissed after copy-preparation time was excluded

The NCLAT dismissed the Revenue’s challenge to the NCLT-approved resolution plan on 2 August 2023.

The Revenue applied for a certified copy on 6 September 2023, received it on 11 October 2023, and filed its appeal under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) on 21 November 2023.

The respondents objected that the appeal was beyond the statutory limitation period, including the maximum period for condonation.

1. Whether limitation for an appeal under Section 62 of the IBC begins on the date the NCLAT pronounces its order or on the date the appellant receives the certified copy.

2. Whether, after excluding the time requisite to obtain the certified copy, the appeal filed on 21 November 2023 was within the statutory limitation period and condonable extension.

Section 62 of the IBC provides 45 days to appeal to the Supreme Court, with a further period of up to 15 days that may be allowed for sufficient cause; the 60-day outer limit cannot be extended.

Under Section 238-A of the IBC, Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies “as far as may be,” permitting exclusion of the time requisite to obtain a copy; under its Explanation, time taken to prepare the order before a copy is applied for is not excluded.

The Court relied on Sagufa Ahmed v. Upper Assam Plywood Products Private Limited for the distinction between the prescribed limitation period and a condonable period, V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat and Power Limited for the IBC’s strict limitation scheme and the need to apply diligently for a certified copy, and CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers Private Limited for the 60-day outer limit under Section 62.

The Court held that limitation commenced on the date the NCLAT pronounced its order, rather than when the appellant later received the certified copy.

Applying Section 12(2), it excluded the 35 days between the copy application and delivery, but not the 35 days between pronouncement and the application.

After receiving the copy, the appellant waited another 41 days before filing. The resulting 76 actionable days exceeded Section 62’s 60-day outer limit.

Treating receipt of the copy as the starting point would, in the Court’s view, make limitation indefinite and undermine Section 12’s role.

Because the appeal was filed beyond the 60-day maximum period, the preliminary objection was upheld and the civil appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation, with no order as to costs.