Illiteracy and ignorance of law, without sufficient particulars, do not justify condoning inordinate delay.

The claimant’s land was notified for acquisition of a right of user under the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962. Compensation was awarded in 2010 and received by the claimant without protest.

On 2 January 2023, he filed a petition under Section 10(2) of the Act read with Rule 5 of the 1963 Rules, seeking redetermination of compensation, together with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone a delay of 12 years, 5 months and 13 days.

He attributed the delay principally to illiteracy and lack of awareness of the Act and the 90-day filing period, and asserted that he had not been properly informed about the award or his rights.

The District Judge allowed the condonation application, relying substantially on Mohar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and directing that no interest be payable for the delayed period.

The company challenged that order under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

1. Whether the claimant established sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 12 years, 5 months and 13 days in filing the compensation-redetermination petition.

2. Whether the District Judge’s order condoning the delay was legally sustainable and warranted interference in supervisory jurisdiction.

Rule 5 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Rules, 1963 requires an application challenging the compensation determination to be filed within 90 days of receipt of the competent authority’s intimation.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act permits condonation only where sufficient cause is established; the explanation must be reasonable and satisfactory, and the court must assess the applicant’s bona fides, diligence and conduct.

A long delay cannot be condoned merely on equitable or sympathetic grounds, and the merits of the underlying claim do not substitute for an adequate explanation.

The Court also referred to Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board on the need to account for the delay over the relevant period and the continuing importance of diligence and inaction when assessing sufficient cause.

The petitioner separately argued that Section 5 was unavailable under the special statutory scheme; although the District Judge rejected that objection by distinguishing land-acquisition reference cases, the High Court’s decision turned on the failure to establish sufficient cause.

The claimant’s explanation—that he was illiterate and unaware of the applicable law and 90-day period—was general and unsupported by material particulars.

The Court noted that he did not dispute receiving the awarded compensation in 2010, accepting it without protest, or failing to pursue a higher claim until 2023; the affidavits also contained vague and inconsistent assertions.

Ignorance of the Act and limitation period, without a sufficiently particularised explanation for the prolonged delay, did not constitute sufficient cause.

The District Judge had relied on the equitable approach in Mohar Singh and the possibility of denying interest, but had not adequately assessed the claimant’s diligence or explained the delay.

The High Court therefore found the condonation order unsupported by valid reasons and contrary to the governing principles on limitation.

The writ petition was allowed; the order dated 9 July 2025 was set aside, the Section 5 application was dismissed, and, consequently, the claimant’s petition under Section 10(2) of the 1962 Act read with Rule 5 of the 1963 Rules was dismissed.