In an eviction suit against a licensee, the plaintiff need only prove better title than the defendant.

The appellants challenged a judgment of affirmance where both the trial and appellate courts granted an eviction decree against them on the ground of being licensees in the suit property.

The respondent (plaintiff) claimed title through his mother, producing records of rights, municipal tax receipts, and khajna receipts.

The appellants contended they were co-owners through a common ancestor (father) and argued that the plaintiff failed to prove absolute title or the specific induction of the appellants as licensees.

The appellants further attempted to introduce suit registers to cast doubt on the plaintiff's records.

1. Whether the plaintiff in a suit for eviction of a licensee is required to prove absolute title to the hilt or merely a better title than the defendant.

2. Whether the court can presume a defendant to be a licensee or trespasser in the absence of proof of a legal right to occupy the premises.

3. Whether the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the respondent's superior title warrant interference in a second appeal.

The court applied the established principle that in a suit for eviction of a licensee, especially where no specific relief of declaration of title is sought, the plaintiff is not required to prove title to the hilt but must only establish a "better title" than the defendant.

The court further applied the evidentiary standard that documents such as records of rights, khajna receipts, and municipal tax records, while not titles in themselves, constitute "overwhelming evidence" of better title in eviction proceedings.

Under the Code of Civil Procedure, Order XLI Rule 11, a second appeal is liable for dismissal if no substantial question of law is involved.

The court reasoned that because the suit was for eviction and not a declaration of title, the respondent's production of Exhibits 1 through 5—including original records of rights, Khajna receipts, and municipal tax receipts—sufficiently established a superior claim to the property.

The court noted that while the parties shared a common father, the documents were exclusively in the name of the respondent’s mother, and the appellants failed to produce any documentation of their own.

Regarding the lack of evidence of "induction" as licensees, the court held that once a plaintiff proves better title, the law presumes the defendants are either licensees or trespassers unless they can prove an independent legal right (such as tenancy or ownership).

Consequently, the effect of the decree remains the same regardless of whether they were technically licensees or trespassers.

It concluded that there was no legal error in the lower courts' findings and that no substantial question of law existed to justify a second appeal.

The appeal (SAT 43 of 2026) was dismissed under Order XLI Rule 11 of the CPC, and the associated application (CAN 1 of 2026) was disposed of with no order as to costs.