In second appeal, factual findings cannot be disturbed absent perversity or a substantial question of law.

The respondent-plaintiff permitted appellant-defendant No. 1 to occupy the suit premises under a Leave and License Agreement dated 3 July 2010.

The arrangement was stated to operate for 11 months, with provisions concerning renewal and use of the premises for business purposes.

The plaintiff alleged that defendant No. 1 defaulted in payment of license fees and unauthorisedly handed over or sublet possession to defendant No. 2.

The plaintiff consequently issued notice demanding outstanding license fees and vacant possession.

The Trial Court, by judgment and decree dated 1 April 2021 in Regular Civil Suit No. 11 of 2015, dismissed the suit after recording evidence.

On appeal, the Additional District Judge, Gandhidham, allowed Regular Civil Appeal No. 16 of 2021 by judgment dated 29 July 2024, set aside the Trial Court’s decree, and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff.

The defendants challenged the appellate decree in the present second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Whether the findings of the First Appellate Court regarding the existence, determination, and breach of the Leave and License Agreement were perverse, grossly erroneous, or otherwise raised a substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 CPC?

Whether, after determination or expiry of the license, defendant No. 1 could lawfully retain possession of the suit premises in the absence of a counterclaim seeking enforcement or renewal of the agreement?

Whether the plaintiff was entitled to recovery of possession and consequential reliefs on establishing the licensor-licensee relationship and termination of the license?

Section 100 CPC restricts the High Court’s jurisdiction in a second appeal to cases involving a substantial question of law; concurrent or factual findings of the courts below cannot ordinarily be disturbed unless they are perverse, unsupported by evidence, based on inadmissible evidence, or contrary to mandatory legal provisions or settled law.

The Court relied on Payal Vision Ltd. v. Radhika Choudhary, (2012) 11 SCC 405, for the principle that, in a possession suit involving an unprotected tenancy, proof of the jural relationship and termination of the tenancy is ordinarily sufficient for recovery of possession.

It also relied on Russi Fisheries (P) Ltd. v. Bhavna Seth, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 555, and Jaichand (Dead) through LRs v. Sahnulal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864, reiterating that a second appellate court cannot reappreciate evidence merely because another factual conclusion is possible, unless the findings suffer from perversity or a clear error of law.

A licensee whose license has expired or been validly determined, and who has no enforceable counterclaim for renewal or specific performance, has no continuing right to retain possession.

The High Court found that the relationship between the parties was that of licensor and licensee and that the Leave and License Agreement had either expired by efflux of time or been determined by the plaintiff’s notice.

Although the defendants challenged the agreement and relied on alleged inconsistencies concerning its duration, the First Appellate Court had considered the agreement, the undertaking at Exhibit 50, and the evidence regarding non-payment of license fees and unauthorised transfer of possession.

The High Court held that the appellants had not demonstrated that the appellate findings were perverse, grossly erroneous, unsupported by evidence, or contrary to any mandatory rule of law.

Since defendant No. 1 had neither filed a counterclaim for enforcement or renewal of the license nor established protection under rent-control legislation, he could not retain possession after determination of the license.

Accordingly, no substantial question of law arose for consideration under Section 100 CPC.

The appellate judgment and decree dated 29 July 2024, directing relief in favour of the plaintiff including recovery of possession, were confirmed.

The Civil Application for stay was disposed of as infructuous, with no order as to costs, and the decree was directed to be drawn accordingly.