Inclusion in a waiting list creates no enforceable appointment right absent a mandatory recruitment rule.

The applicants sought appointment as Upper Division Clerks under the Scheduled Caste category, with consequential benefits, pursuant to the recruitment notification dated 11 August 2015 for 503 vacancies. They were placed at Sl. Nos. 24 and 25 respectively in the Scheduled Caste waiting list.

The applicants contended that several selected candidates did not join, that the waiting list had been operated up to the 23rd Scheduled Caste candidate, and that further vacancies remained available. They also asserted that, out of approximately 600 appointments, only 81 Scheduled Caste candidates had been appointed, resulting in a shortfall against the 16% reservation requirement.

The respondent disputed the applicants’ factual calculations, stating that only 494 appointments had actually been made against the 503 notified vacancies. It contended that the selection and category allocation complied with the applicable Department of Personnel and Training instructions, including the treatment of reserved-category candidates who had availed themselves of age or other concessions.

The respondent further stated that three posts were required to remain vacant pursuant to interim orders in pending proceedings and that the Government had decided on 3 December 2017 to discontinue operation of the waiting list, more than two years after publication of the result on 28 October 2015.

Whether mere inclusion of the applicants’ names in the Scheduled Caste waiting list conferred an indefeasible or enforceable right to appointment against unfilled vacancies?

Whether the respondent’s decision to discontinue operation of the waiting list after 3 December 2017 was arbitrary, illegal, or contrary to any mandatory statutory or recruitment provision?

Whether the existence of unfilled vacancies or alleged shortfall in Scheduled Caste appointments required the respondent to appoint the applicants from the waiting list?

The Tribunal applied the settled principle that inclusion in a select list or waiting list does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment, and that the State is not ordinarily legally bound to fill all notified vacancies unless the applicable recruitment rules impose such an obligation.

It relied on Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, as quoted in State of Karnataka v. Smt. Bharathi S., 2023 INSC 573, for the rule that successful candidates acquire no absolute right to appointment, although the State cannot act arbitrarily or discriminatorily.

It also relied on Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, Civil Appeal Nos. 2634–2636 of 2013, decided on 7 November 2024, for the principle that even inclusion in a select list does not create an indefeasible right where the competent authority bona fide decides not to fill vacancies.

State of Karnataka v. Smt. Bharathi S. further establishes that operation of an additional or waiting list is mandatory only where such obligation arises from a statutory rule or applicable recruitment provision.

The Tribunal also referred to State of Uttar Pradesh v. Karunesh Kumar, Civil Appeal Nos. 8822–8823 of 2022, for the limited scope of judicial interference in selection and appointment matters absent arbitrariness or illegality.

The recruitment process was additionally assessed with reference to the DoPT Office Memoranda dated 22 May 1989 and 1 July 1998 concerning allocation of reserved-category candidates.

The Tribunal held that the applicants’ placement at Sl. Nos. 24 and 25 in the waiting list did not, by itself, create a right to appointment.

The applicants’ reliance on the alleged number of appointments, the unfilled vacancies, and the reservation shortfall was insufficient because the respondent’s official position was that only 494 appointments had been made against 503 notified vacancies, with certain posts remaining unfilled or being kept vacant pursuant to interim judicial orders.

The Tribunal found no statutory rule or recruitment condition requiring the respondent to continue operating the waiting list or to fill every remaining vacancy through it.

The Government’s decision dated 3 December 2017 to discontinue the waiting list after more than two years was treated as a conscious decision of the competent authority, and the record disclosed no mala fides, arbitrariness, discrimination, or extraneous consideration.

In the absence of a mandatory obligation to operate the waiting list, the existence of vacancies did not convert the applicants’ contingent claim into an enforceable appointment right.

The decision to discontinue the waiting list was found neither arbitrary nor illegal.

Accordingly, the claim for appointment as Upper Division Clerks, with arrears, seniority, and other consequential benefits, was rejected, and the Original Application was dismissed without costs.