Independent claimants asserting pre-existing title may challenge compromise decrees before the recording court via Section 151.

The petitioner, S. Indushekhar, is the son of late Sanna Sharanappa. He claimed that a common ancestor, S.B. Veeranagouda, had partitioned properties between his two sons, Sanna Sharanappa and Dodda Sharanappa, leading to a complete severance of status between the two branches

Respondent No. 1 (from the other branch) filed O.S. No. 39/2008 for partition

Although Defendant No. 1 in that suit specifically pleaded that certain properties (e.g., Survey No. 166A) belonged to the petitioner, the petitioner was not impleaded.

Following a remand from the High Court, the parties to the suit entered into a compromise decree on July 3, 2018, which included properties the petitioner claimed as his own, as well as new properties not in the original plaint

The petitioner filed an application under Order XXIII Rule 3 r/w Section 151 CPC to recall the decree

The Trial Court rejected it on November 25, 2022, holding that as a "stranger" to the suit, his only remedy was an independent suit

The court applied Order XXIII Rule 3 and Rule 3A of the CPC, which bars a separate suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise was not "lawful"

The Court relied on Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi, establishing that the court recording a compromise retains jurisdiction to examine its legality

The Court relied on Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, which clarified that the exclusive remedy for an aggrieved person is the court that recorded the compromise

It applied Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh, distinguishing between a "derivative stranger" (who must move the original court) and an "independent stranger" (who may file a new suit if not seeking to impeach the compromise itself)

The High Court found the Trial Court’s "stranger" vs. "party" distinction too simplistic. It held that the true test is the nature of the right: if the claim is derivative (tracing title through a party), Rule 3A bars an independent suit; if the title is independent and pre-existing, a separate suit is generally permissible

In this specific case, the Court observed that the compromise decree dealt with properties specifically admitted in the original pleadings to belong to the petitioner. Furthermore, the parties had expanded the suit's scope during the compromise to include properties not originally litigated

The Court reasoned that as long as the 2018 compromise decree subsisted, any independent suit by the petitioner for declaration of title would face "conflicting adjudications"

Therefore, because the issues of prior severance, self-acquisition, and non-joinder was "inextricably intertwined" with the legality of the compromise decree, the ends of justice required the decree to be reopened by the Court that passed it to avoid multiplicity of proceedings

It allowed the writ petition, set aside the order dated November 25, 2022, and recalled the compromise decree dated July 3, 2018. The Court ordered the restoration of O.S. No. 39/2008, directed that the petitioner be impleaded as a party, and instructed the Trial Court to conduct a fresh adjudication on the merits, including the issues of prior severance and the character of the properties, within nine months