Indiscriminate firing by an unlawful assembly establishes Section 302/149 liability without identifying the fatal shooter.

On 9 November 2012, Uday Singh and members of his family and group went to a temple for worship. The prosecution alleged that Vijay Singh Chauhan and the other accused objected to their presence, claimed ownership over the temple, and opened indiscriminate fire. Vijay Singh allegedly fired at Uday Singh, who sustained a fatal firearm injury and died shortly thereafter. Several prosecution witnesses claimed to have witnessed the incident, although none sustained firearm injuries.

A Dehati Nalishi was lodged by Hariom Singh, naming the accused and identifying Lokendra Singh and Mahesh Chauhan as eyewitnesses.

The post-mortem disclosed an entry wound on the left abdomen and an exit wound near the lumbar region; the medical opinion was that the firearm injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

The Sessions Court convicted Vijay Singh under Section 302 IPC and the other convicted accused under Sections 302/149 and 148 IPC, sentencing them to life imprisonment and additional imprisonment for rioting with deadly weapons. It acquitted Devendra Singh Chauhan, Kalla alias Ramkishore Chauhan and Amreshi Singh Chauhan. The convicted accused appealed, while the State appealed against the acquittal.

During the pendency of the appeal, Shankar Singh died and the appeal abated as against him.

Whether the ocular testimony of the prosecution witnesses was reliable despite the absence of injuries to the eyewitnesses and the alleged discrepancies between the ocular and medical evidence?

Whether the medical evidence concerning the downward trajectory of the bullet contradicted the prosecution version regarding the firing and the assailants’ positions?

Whether the convicted accused constituted an unlawful assembly sharing the common object of committing Uday Singh’s murder, thereby attracting Sections 148 and 302/149 IPC?

Whether the plea of alibi raised by Megh Singh was established by credible and independent evidence?

Whether the acquittal of Devendra Singh Chauhan, Kalla alias Ramkishore Chauhan and Amreshi Singh Chauhan was liable to be reversed in the State’s appeal?

The Court applied Sections 148, 149 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code: Section 148 concerns rioting while armed with a deadly weapon; Section 302 punishes murder; and Section 149 fixes constructive liability on every member of an unlawful assembly for an offence committed in prosecution of its common object.

The Court reiterated that minor discrepancies which do not affect the core of an otherwise reliable testimony are not sufficient to reject it, relying on State (Delhi Administration) v. Laxman Kumar, (1985) 4 SCC 476, and Wilson Fernandes v. Nitin Pandurang, (2004) 2 MWN (Cri) DCC 32 (Bom).

It further applied the principle that the absence of injury to an eyewitness does not, by itself, establish that the witness was not present or did not see the occurrence.

In an appeal against acquittal, interference is justified only where the acquittal is perverse, manifestly erroneous, or results in a miscarriage of justice; substantial and compelling reasons are required, as stated in Shivajirao Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033.

The Court also held that an alibi must be proved through cogent, preferably independent, ocular or documentary evidence and cannot ordinarily rest solely on the accused’s uncorroborated testimony.

The Court found that the eyewitnesses’ presence was supported by the prompt Dehati Nalishi, the consistent account of firing, the recovery of blood-stained soil and numerous empty cartridges, and bullet marks on the temple structure.

Their failure to sustain injuries was attributed to their alertness in taking shelter inside the temple and was not treated as inconsistent with indiscriminate firing.

The difference between the initial version and subsequent testimony regarding whether Vijay Singh fired from the ground floor or the temple roof was considered a minor discrepancy arising from the confused circumstances of sustained firing.

The Court accepted that the bullet could have deflected after striking the spine, thereby explaining the downward exit trajectory without discrediting the prosecution case.

Because all the convicted accused were armed and firing pursuant to a common plan, the Court held that the fatal shot could not be attributed with certainty to any individual accused.

Consequently, Vijay Singh’s individual conviction under Section 302 IPC was modified to one under Section 302/149 IPC, while the finding of common object and the convictions under Sections 302/149 and 148 IPC were otherwise sustained.

Megh Singh’s alibi failed because it was unsupported by his sister, brother-in-law, or any documentary evidence and his own testimony was found unreliable.

Conversely, the evidence against the acquitted respondents did not establish their specific participation, use of weapons, exhortation, or membership of the unlawful assembly. The material contradictions and absence of proof of any overt or legally attributable role justified applying the heightened standard applicable to an appeal against acquittal.

The convictions and sentences of the remaining convicted appellants under Sections 148 and 302/149 IPC were upheld.

Criminal Appeal No. 547/2016 abated to the extent of deceased appellant Shankar Singh.

The State’s appeal against the acquittal of Devendra Singh Chauhan, Kalla alias Ramkishore Chauhan and Amreshi Singh Chauhan was dismissed.

The appellants remaining on bail were directed to surrender before the trial Court by 31 August 2026, failing which coercive measures could be taken; upon surrender or arrest, they were to be committed to custody to undergo the remaining sentence.