Inherent power cannot recall a consciously withdrawn suit absent bona fide justification.

The petitioner, as plaintiff, instituted O.S. No. 180 of 2019 seeking declaration of his right over the suit property and a consequential permanent injunction against the first defendant.

The first defendant filed a counter-claim seeking declaration that the boundaries described in the settlement deed dated 21.11.2008, concerning 3,600 sq. ft., related to Survey No. 94/13B2, together with recovery of possession from the plaintiff.

Despite filing a reply to the counter-claim, the plaintiff submitted a memo seeking withdrawal of the suit, initially stating that the parties had settled the matter.

After objection by the first defendant, the plaintiff filed a second memo seeking withdrawal without reserving liberty to institute a fresh suit.

The trial Court permitted withdrawal of the suit on 11.04.2022, while continuing the counter-claim.

The plaintiff subsequently sought recall of the order permitting withdrawal under Section 151 CPC, along with condonation of a delay of 1,431 days.

The trial Court dismissed both applications.

In the meantime, the plaintiff had obtained mutation of the revenue records in his favour after withdrawing the suit, while the first defendant successfully challenged the mutation proceedings in writ proceedings.

In W.A. No. 1913 of 2024, disposed of on 09.09.2025, the Division Bench granted liberty to the plaintiff to pursue appropriate proceedings, including an application for restoration of the suit.

The plaintiff thereafter filed the present civil revision petitions challenging the trial Court’s orders dated 01.07.2026 in I.A. Nos. 12 and 13 of 2026.

Whether an application seeking recall of an order permitting withdrawal of a suit is maintainable under the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 CPC, notwithstanding the absence of an express provision in the CPC?

Whether Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies to such an application and, if so, whether the application filed within three years from the liberty granted by the Division Bench was barred by delay or limitation?

Whether the petitioner established sufficient grounds and bona fides warranting exercise of the Court’s inherent power to recall the withdrawal order?

The absence of an express provision in the Code of Civil Procedure does not bar an application to recall an order permitting withdrawal of a suit; such an application may be entertained under the Court’s inherent powers under Section 151 CPC.

This principle was supported by Jet Plywood (P) Ltd. v. Madhukar Nowlakha, where the Supreme Court recognised the power to recall a withdrawal order in appropriate circumstances, and Rajendra Prasad Gupta v. Prakash Chandra Mishra, which held that there is no express bar against withdrawal of a withdrawal application.

Once the application is treated as one under Section 151 CPC and no specific limitation period is prescribed, the residuary Article 137 of the Limitation Act, prescribing three years from the date when the right to apply accrues, applies, as recognised in Karuppa Gounder v. Pongiyanna Gounder.

However, the power under Section 151 CPC is discretionary and cannot be invoked as a matter of right; the applicant must establish a strong, bona fide and just ground for recalling the earlier order.

The Court also relied on the principles concerning delay, bona fides and discretionary relief discussed in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved Prakash, Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran and Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board.

The Court accepted the petitioner’s legal contention that the recall application was maintainable under Section 151 CPC and that Article 137, rather than the ordinary delay framework under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, governed its filing.

Since the Division Bench granted liberty on 09.09.2025 and the applications were filed within three years thereafter, the Court held that limitation or laches could not independently defeat the applications.

Nevertheless, maintainability and limitation did not automatically entitle the petitioner to recall.

The petitioner had twice voluntarily sought withdrawal, was represented by counsel, knew that the counter-claim would survive, and personally signed the second withdrawal memo.

He had also obtained mutation of the revenue records after withdrawing the suit, thereby taking advantage of the withdrawal.

The Court found that these circumstances contradicted the claim that withdrawal was merely a mistake and demonstrated a lack of bona fides.

The liberty granted by the Division Bench only enabled the petitioner to approach the civil Court; it did not mandate restoration or require the Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction.

Accordingly, although the applications were procedurally maintainable and within the Article 137 period, no sufficient or just ground existed for recalling the withdrawal order.

It held that the petitioner was not entitled to invoke Section 151 CPC because his withdrawal had been conscious and voluntary, and his subsequent conduct lacked bona fides.

The Court clarified, however, that withdrawal of the plaintiff’s suit did not affect the surviving counter-claim, and the petitioner remained entitled to contest that counter-claim on its merits.

No order as to costs was made, and the connected miscellaneous petition was closed.