Inherent powers permit quashing criminal proceedings where a former minor and accused marry after majority and live happily.

An FIR was registered at Police Station Badarpur under Section 363 IPC concerning the alleged disappearance of respondent No. 2, who was then a minor. During investigation, the petitioner, Nadir, was identified as being in a relationship with her. He subsequently evaded warrants and was declared a proclaimed offender. Respondent No. 2 was recovered on 13 September 2022 with a child, whom she stated was born from her relationship with the petitioner.

The petitioner was arrested and remained in custody for more than one year before being granted bail on 16 February 2024.

The parties subsequently married according to Muslim rites on 15 December 2023, after respondent No. 2 attained majority, and were living together. They had two children and respondent No. 2 was expecting a third child.

The charge-sheet invoked Sections 363, 366, 376 and 174A IPC, Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act, Section 84 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, and Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006; charges had not yet been framed.

Respondent No. 2 appeared before the Court, confirmed that she was living happily with the petitioner, and stated that the settlement was voluntary and free from coercion. She expressed no objection to quashing the FIR and consequential proceedings.

Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, to quash the FIR and consequential proceedings on the basis of a voluntary settlement between the parties, despite the offences alleged under the IPC, POCSO Act and other protective statutes?

Whether continuation of the criminal proceedings would serve any meaningful purpose where the parties had married after the respondent attained majority, were living together happily, and had children from the relationship?

The Court exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.

The Court considered the offences alleged under Sections 363, 366, 376 and 174A IPC, Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act, Section 84 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, and Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006.

It relied on Ayyub Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 637, which recognised that continuation of criminal proceedings may be quashed where it would constitute a painful interference in the peaceful matrimonial life of parties who are living together happily.

The Court also relied on Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab, (2008) 4 SCC 582, and the Delhi High Court decisions in Mohd. Parwej v. State, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 1030; Harmeet Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 SCC OnLine Del 1707; and Prem Kumar v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 628, applying the principle that proceedings may be quashed where their continuation would serve no real or meaningful purpose in the particular matrimonial circumstances.

The Court verified the marriage and interacted with respondent No. 2 in chambers due to the sensitivity of the matter.

Respondent No. 2, having attained majority, expressly affirmed that she was living happily with the petitioner and had entered into the settlement voluntarily, without coercion or influence.

The marriage had taken place after she became an adult, and the parties were residing together with their children. Applying the principle in Ayyub Malik and the other cited authorities, the Court held that continuing the prosecution would unnecessarily burden the parties and reopen a chapter of their lives that they had chosen to close.

In these circumstances, further proceedings would not advance any meaningful purpose and would amount to a painful interference in their existing matrimonial life.

FIR No. 282/2019 dated 12 June 2019, registered at Police Station Badarpur, together with all consequential proceedings arising from it, was quashed.

The parties’ original affidavits were directed to be filed before the Trial Court within four weeks so that they could form part of the Trial Court record. The petition was accordingly disposed of.